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Abstract 
Four studies were conducted in an effort to evaluate the relative ments of three 
different hypotheses conceming the cognitive processes underlying suggested hypnotic 
arnnesia: the sociocognitive view of Spanos and his colleagues (Spanos. 1986). the 
dissociated expenence hypothesis forwarded by Kihlstrom (KiNstrom, 1984; l992), and 
the dissociated control hypothesis forwarded by Woody and Bowers ( 1994). These 
hypotheses were evaluated in three studies by means of a selective arnnesia suggestion in 
the recall organization paradigrn. In the first two studies hem rate was used as a 
nonsubjective measure of cognitive effort in order to explore the nlationship between 
hypnosis, hypnotic ability and task-relevant thoughts and imagery on the one hand and 
cognitive effon on the other. The fint study was designed to determine if trying to forget 
the targeted material in a task-motivated way would indeed result in a significant heart rate 
increase compared to simply anticipating the onset of the arnnesia trial. Participants 
unselected for hypnotic ability were adrninistered instructions for relaxation and then asked 
to leam a categorized word list. M e r  learning the word list to criterion, participants in the 
expenmental condition were given task-motivation instructions to try to forget some of the 
words whereas participants in the control condition received instructions to simply wait for 
a subsequent recall trial. Participants given task-motivated instructions showed an increase 
in heart rate during the subsequent waiting period over and above that obsemed for 
participants who received instructions to simply wait for the subsequent recali uial. Thus, 
heart rate appeared to be a potentiaily useful independent measun of cognitive effon in this 
context. 
In the second study. high and low hypnotically susceptible participants were 
administered an hypnotic induction followed by a suggestion for selective amnesia. Once 
again. heart rate appeared to be a useful independent mesure of cognitive effort in this 
context and according to the cardiac index, it appeared that participants with high hypnotic 
ability were working no harder to enact the suggestion thm were participants with low 
hypnotic ability. although they were much more successful in doing so. 
Study Three was designed to compare the effects of a standard suggestion for 
selective amnesia with the effects of a distraction task which effectively prevented 
task-relevant thoughts and imagery (Le. selective rehearsai) during the waiting penod. 
Participants who were prevented from engaging in task relevant thoughts and imagery by 
the distraction task were just as amnesic as participants who received a standard suggestion 
for amnesia. a result which poses a serious threat to the view (Spanos, 1986; Kihlstrom, 
1992) that the presence or absence of task-relevant thoughts or imagery is an important 
determinant of hypnotic responding. 
Finally, Study Four was designed to explore the performance of participants with 
high and low hypnotic ability on a variety of memory tasks thought to be sensitive to 
frontal lobe functioning. Results were generally consistent with the view that then may be 
some interesting memory effects both within and outside of the context of hypnosis for 
participants with high hypnotic ability. 
Results across studies were generaiiy more supportive of the dissociated controi 
theory of hypnotic responding proposed by Woody and Bowers (1994) than either the 
sociocognitive theory proposed by Spanos (1986) or the dissociated experience theory of 
Kihlsuom ( 1992). Theoretical implications are discussed. 
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General Introduction 
In times past. it was widely assumed that the "trance" associated with hypnosis was 
a form of mificial sleep and that somnabulists would have no post-hypnotic recollection of 
the events that occurred while they were "asleep" (Evans, 1988). More recently, this view 
has been replaced with the view that post-hypnotic amnesia is only expenenced as the 
result of direct suggestions to that effect and that spontaneous amnesia is neither an 
interesting nor essential feature of high hypnotic ability (Davidson. 1986; Kihlstrom and 
Schacter, 1995). As a result, researchen have concentrated their efforts on the study of 
suggested amnesia (Spanos, 1986; Kihlstrom and Evans, 1979; Davidson and Bowers, 
199 1). 
The research on suggested amnesia has usually been undertaken using the axmesia 
item of a variety of siandardized scales of hypnotic ability. including the Stanford Hypnotic 
Susceptibility Scale, Foms A, B. and C (SHSS:A, SHSS:B, SHSS:C) (Weitzenhoffer and 
Hilgard, 1959; 1962) and the Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility Form A 
(HGSHS:A). These measures are quite similar and consist of a standard hypnotic induction 
procedure followed by 10 to 12 suggestions of increasing difficulty. Passing an item is 
based on participants' subjective reports and requires that participants report some 
alteration in their experience. For example, participants might be asked to "experience" a 
fly buzzing closely around their head. For many of the suggested alterations in subjective 
expenence there is some behavioural expenence which can be used to evaluate their 
response following the end of the hypnosis session. For example, during the above "fly" 
suggestion, participants are encouraged to brush an annoying fly away. The number of 
suggestions passed, according to subjective reports, yields a score ranging from O to 17. 
Participants are then usually classified as having low (O+, medium (5-7) or high (8-1 2) 
hypnotic ability (Evans, 1988). 
Towards the end of the standard scales participants are given a suggestion for 
post-hypnotic amnesia for ail of the events of the hypnosis session. Then, after termination 
of hypnosis, participants are asked to recall their experience of hypnosis by writing down 
al1 they cm remember about the events of the session. After participants have had a few 
minutes to write down what they can remember of the events during hypnosis, the amnesia 
suggestion is cancelled by giving a prearranged reversal cue, such as, "Now you can 
remember everythng!" (Shor and Orne, 1962, p. 1 1). Participants are then asked to report 
anything they could not remember previous to the reversal cue. 
Using the above approach, the degree of suggested amnesia cm be quantified by 
comparing the number of suggestions participants remember before the administration of 
the reversal cue with the number of suggestions they remember after the administration of 
the revend cue (Evans, 1988). For example, at the University of Waterloo, participants are 
considered amnesic on the Waterloo-Stanford Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility, Group C 
(WSGC) if they recall three or fewer of the items before the administration of the revenai 
cue and they recall three or more additional items following the cancellation of the 
suggestion. Responses to suggestions for amnesia, in t e m  of both amnesia (Hilgard, 1965; 
Kihlstrom and Evans, 1979) and reversibility (Kihlstrom and Evans, 1976; Kihlstrom and 
Register, 1984), are positively cornlated with hypnotic ability. For exarnple, Hiigard 
(1965) reports a correlation of .69 between the amnesia item on the SHSS:C and the overall 
score with the amnesia item omitted. 
What makes the phenomenon of suggested amnesia especially compelling is that 
participants appear to be unable to recall the targeted information even if they report that 
they know that something is "missing." In addition, participants most ofren report 
experiencing the forgetting as something that just "happens" non-volitionally. Indeed, the 
very essence of the experience of hypnosis appears to be the experience of nonvolition that 
frequently accompanies hypnotically suggested behaviour, which Weitzenhoffer ( 1953) has 
termed the "classic suggestion effect" (Bowers and Davidson. 199 1). 
There are currently three dominant models of hypnotic responding to account for 
such effects: the sociocognitive view, the dissociated expenence view, and the dissociated 
control view. The sociocognitive position, as advocated by Spanos (1986) and more 
recently by L ~ M ,  Rhue and Weeks (1990). is that after king given a suggestion for 
amnesia, participants actively and purposefully engage in a strategic effort to enact the 
suggestion to forget. More specifically, according to Spanos (1986). suggested amnesia is 
achieved when participants actively direct their attention away from or "disattend to" 
retrieval cues that otherwise facilitate recail of previously leanied material (Spanos, 1986; 
Spanos and Radtke, 1982). Advocates of this position argue that the passive or 
non-volitional expenencing of suggested amnesia is due to an attributional error that is 
largely the result of the contextual demands of the hypnotic situation (Kirsch and Council. 
1992). h this view, participants essentially fool themselves into thinking that they have 
forgotten the targeted matenal non-volitionally, when, in fact. they are actively engaged in 
keeping the targeted matenal out of mind via task-relevant thoughts and imagery (Spaoos, 
1986; Lynn, Rhue and Weekes, 1990). 
There is a long history of dissociative accounts of hypnotic phenomena. Janet 
( 190 1, l9OV 1965) argued that under stress various mentai contents, including ideas. could 
be dissociated from consciousness. Because they were no longer available to consciousness 
and thereby not potentidly under conscious control. the dissociated ideas could produce the 
symptoms then associated with hysteria. According to Janet (1901, 1907/1965), the 
phenomena observed following an hypnotic induction were the result of exposing people 
who were aiready vulnerable to dissociation to a situation which promoted it. More 
recently, but very much in the same tradition. E.R. Hilgard (1973, 1979) has descnbed 
dissociation as resulting when a system of ideas becomes separated from consciousness by 
an "amnestic barrier." Hilgard (1973, 1979) based his theory on the sotailed "hidden 
observer" phenomenon. In a large number of experiments, Hilgard and his colleagues 
demonstrated that one "part" of a person (a hidden observer) cm be aware of a pain or 
memory that another (conscious) part of that person knows nothing about. Hilgard's 
conclusion (1 973. 1979) was that two or more parallel strearns of consciousness can exist 
as the result of a "split" in consciousness. According to more =cent proponents of this 
theory (Kihlstrom, 1992; S hor. 1979), what is dissociated fiom consciousness, 
presumably because of an amnestic barrier, is the participant's expenence of actively 
enacting the suggestion. As in the sociocognitive position. advocates of the dissociated 
experience position argue that considerable effort and control are required to produce the 
suggested state of affairs; however, these are hypothesized to be carried out in a pardlel 
stream of consciousness and blocked fIom consciousness by an amnestic b h e r .  In shori, 
according to the theory of dissociated expenence. the production of hypnotic behaviour. 
including task-relevant thoughts and imagery, is effortful but awareness of the 
self-mediated nature of the experience is not avaiiable to consciousness. 
There are severd senous problems with the dissociated experience 
conceptualization of hypnosis (Woody and Bowen, 1994). Most importantly to the present 
purpose is that the theory of dissociated experience offea a very similar explanation to the 
sociocognitive (Spanos, 1986) account of the nonvolitional experience of hypnotic 
responding. According to both theories, participants engage in voluntary efforts to enact 
suggestions, including the use of task-relevant thoughts and imagery, but the volitional 
nature of the response is either misattributed in a way consistent with current 
social-psyc hological theory (Spanos, 1986; Lynn, Rhue and Weekes, 1990) or somehow 
blocked frorn awareness by an amnestic barrier in a way that produces incorrect attributions 
about volition (Kihlsuom, 1992, Shor, 1979). According to both theones, there is no real 
change in the usual hierarchy of the cognitive control of behaviour as the result of an 
hypnotic induction. According to the sociocognitive (Spanos, 1986; Lynn, Rhue and 
Weekes, 199 1) position, participants may rnistakenly believe that hypnosis involves some 
fundamental change in the way behaviour is controiied due to contextual pressures to make 
misattributions about their volitional behaviour. Simiiarly. according to the dissociated 
experience (Kihistrom. 1992; Shor, 1979) account, hypnotic behaviour is controlled and 
executed in the same way as any nonhypnotic behaviour, but it is the participant's 
expenence of why the behaviour occumd that is unavaiiable to them because of an 
amnestic banier (Woody and Bowen, 1994). 
In contrat to the preceding views of hypnotic responding. according to the theory of 
dissociated control, as fiat proposed by Bowen (Bowen. 1992; Davidson and Bowers. 
1991) and more recently by Woody and Bowen (1994). hypnosis alters the actud 
underlying control of behaviour and not just attributions about control. According to the 
dissociated control account, hypnosis results in a relative weakening of the executive-level 
of cognitive control responsible for the initiation and monitoring of behaviour. As a result. 
in hypnosis lower levels of cognitive control become disco~ected from executive control 
in a manner that is consistent with disturbances associated with frontal lobe dmage 
(Woody and Bowen, 1994). In this view hypnotic suggestions work by directly and 
automatically activating lower level cognitive subsystems, with the implication that 
executive initiative, effort and control are bypassed and routinized behaviours are mn-off 
without volitional control and effort. According to this view, participants may fail to recall 
materid targeted for amnesia because, like frontal lobe patients (Shallice, 1988; 
Shimrnarnura. 1995), they fail to spontaneously initiate and engage in the necessary 
retneval strategies. Indeed, according to Woody and Bowen (1994). the deficits in memory 
observed following suggestions for amnesia rather stnkingly resemble the memory deficits 
observed following frontal lobe darnage. 
It is important to note that according to the dissociated conuol account, participants 
may make important misattributions about their expenence of amnesia According to 
Davidson and Bowers (199 1). participants cm become amnesic without any executively 
wiiied intention to do so. However, participants may rnistakedy amibute their amnesia to 
some effort on their part or to task-relevant thoughts and images, which occur following the 
suggestion for amnesia. 
To sum up so far, according to the sociocognitive position (Spanos. 1986; Lynn, 
Rhue and Weekes, 1990). following suggestions for arnnesia hypnotized participants 
actively and purposefully try to forget using task-relevant thoughts and imagery and are 
essentially deceiving themselves when they report their experiences as being "passive" and 
"non-volitional." Sirnilarly, according to the dissociated expenence mode1 (Kihlstrom, 
1992), the experience of involuntariness associated with hypnotic responding is entirely 
illusory because the control and effort involved in enacting a suggestion for arnnesia is 
hidden from consciousness by some kind of amnestic barrier, in the manner of "a cover up 
of a cover up" (Erdelyi and Goldberg, 1979). According to both the sociocognitive and 
dissociated expenence accounts, amnesic participants are actively "doing" something to 
enact the suggestion for amnesia. in contrast, according to dissociated control theory, 
because of the reduction of higher-level executive control of behaviour during hypnosis, 
mernories can become dissociated from conscious expenence relatively effortlessly, 
although participants may be mistaken insofar as they assume that they must actively "do" 
something in order to achieve suggested arnnesia. 
According to ail three available explanations, subjective reports of volitionai versus 
non-volitional expenences can be quite problematic. However, the available theories grant 
very diffennt importance to the role of task-relevant thoughts and irnagery. According to 
the sociocognitive and dissociated expeience accounts, task-relevant thoughts and imagery 
are centrally important in determinhg hypnotic responding (Spanos, 1986; Kihlstrom, 
1992). In contrast, according to the dissociated control perspective (Woody and Bowea, 
1994; Hargdon, Bowers and Woody. 1995). task-relevant thoughts and imagery are not 
important determinants of hypnotic responding because "dissociation is primarily 
concemed with the fact that subsystems of control can be directly and autornatically 
activated, instead of being govemed by high level executive control" (Bowers. 1992, p. 
267). Indeed, according to the dissociated control perspective. asking participants to engage 
in producing task-relevant thoughts and imagery rnight interfere with hypnotic responding 
(cf. Hargadon, Bowers and Woody, 1995) because initiating and maintaining such 
behaviour rnight be expected to be more dificult for people with compromised executive 
func tioning (Norman and S hallice, 1986). 
Empirical Resemch 
Previous researchen have attempted to evaiuate whether or not suggested amnesia 
occun as the result of an active attempt to forget the material targeted for amnesia. 
Davidson and Bowers (199 1) reponed two experiments in which they employed the Recail 
Organization paradigm in a study of selective amnesia. In those studies, participants lemed 
a word list comprised of four categories of four words each and were then administered a 
suggestion to be amnesic for al1 of the words in one of the categories. After a 30 second 
waiting period, participants were asked to recall the 12 other words. The most important 
aspect of the word list is that it was categonzed. Recalling the words in a category by 
category fashion serves as a powerfbl aid in memorizing the list of words in the fmt place. 
Accordingly, nmembering the 12 words not targeted for amnesia in a category-by-category 
fashion should be a powerful cue for recalling the four words in the category that was 
targeted for amnesia Davidson and Bowers (199 1) reported that even when participants 
were completely amnesic for the target words. they were able to successfully recall the 
words not targeted for m e s i a  in a highly organized, category-by-category fashion. 
Davidson and Bowers (199 1) interpreted these results as being evidence against the view 
that suggested amnesia results when hypnotized participants active1 y "disattend" from 
relevant reuieval cues (Spanos, 1986; Spanos and Radtke. 1982). 
Using a quite different paradigrn, Bowen and Woody ( 1996) have provided support 
for the view that the processes underlying suggested amnesia are quite different from the 
processes engaged when people deliberately try to avoid thinking of material targeted for 
amnesia. In brief, Wegner (1989) had reported that when non-hypnotized participants who 
are asked to deliberately and actively attempt to suppress a thought or image, they are 
paradoxicd!y prone to intrusions of the proscribed material. Bowers and Woody ( 1996) 
demonstrated that suggested amnesia did not produce the sarne paradoxical intrusions of 
the target matenal and concluded that the processes responsibie for thought suppression and 
suggested amnesia are quite different. 
There has been little research on the degree to which the expenence of task-relevant 
thoughts and imagery is an important determinant of suggested amnesia However, there 
has been a similar debate about the processes responsible for hypnotic analgesia. In the 
suggested analgesia Literature. the important points of disagreement between sociocognitive 
and dissociation control theories are the degree to which task relevant (counter pain) 
imagery mediates hypnotic responding and whether such imagery is engaged in by 
hypnotized participants as an active attempt to reduce pain (Spanos, 1986; Lynn and Sivec, 
1992) or as a passively experienced concomitant of direct suggestions for such imagery 
(Miller and Bowers, 1993; Hargadon, Bowers and Woody. 1995). 
Miller and Bowers (1993) compared the pain reduction expenenced by participants 
who were given either standard suggestions for amnesia or a stress inoculation procedure. 
Participants with high hypnotic ability were found to experience less pain as compared to 
participants with low hypnotic ability in both conditions. However, participants with high 
hypnotic ability demonstnted impaired performance on a cognitively demancihg task 
(vocabulaiy task) that competed for cognitive resources in the stress inoculation. but not the 
hypnotic analgesia condition. Miiler and Bowers (1993) concluded that hypnotic analgesia 
occurs with little or no cognitive effort, senously challenging both the sociocognitive 
mode1 of hypnotic nsponding and the dissociated experience exphnation insofar as 
strategic cognitive mechanisms operating outside of awareness might also be expected to 
produce some draw on cognitive resources. 
Hargadon, Bowen and Woody (1995) reported a study in which hypnotized 
participants received a baseline exposure to a pain stimulus, followed by two 
counterbalanced hypnotic analgesia conditions. The standard analgesia condition invoked 
counter pain imagery, whereas the imageless analgesia condition proscnbed such imagery. 
The results of the study were quite unsupportive of the sociocognitive position, insofar as 
the mean level of pain reduction experienced by participants in the two conditions was 
vimially identical. In addition, Hargadon et al. (1995) reported that the task-relevant 
thoughts and imagery experienced by participants as active efforts to cope with the pain 
were less common and resulted in less pain reduction than werr cognitions experienced as 
passive concomitants of pain reduction. Hargadon et al. (1995) concluded that task-relevant 
thoughts and irnagery were not necessary for producing suggested 
analgesia and are simply a passively experienced concomitant of direct suggestions for such 
irnagery . 
Overview of the Present Studies 
The experimentd results descnbed above seem to indicate that, in contrast to what 
the sociocognitive position (Spanos, 1986) would suggest, suggested amnesia is the result 
of processes diffennt from those involved in trying to forget (Davidson and Bowers, 199 1; 
Bowen and Woody. 1996). in addition, results from the analgesia literature (Miller and 
Bowers, 1993; Hargadon et al., 1995) cast senous doubt on the imponance of cognitive 
effon and "imaginative involvement" in the experience of suggested effects. The purpose of 
the present studies is to undentand funher the importance of effort and "imaginative 
involvement" in hypnotic responding by extending previous efforts (Miller and Bowers, 
1993; Hargadon et al., 1995) into the redm of suggested amnesia. It was hoped that these 
investigations might help to discem which of the three currently available theones can best 
explain the phenomena of hypnotic responding. To that end, the present studies were 
designed to address three questions: 1) whether or not cognitive effon is an important 
determinant of suggested amnesia; 2) whether or not task-relevant thoughts and imagery are 
an important determinant of suggested amnesia; and 3) whether or not hypnotized 
participants have difficulty with memory tasks in a manner consistent with attenuated 
executive funcîioning, as suggested by the dissociated control mode1 (Woody 
and Bowers, 1994). 
According to both the sociocognitive (Spanos. 1986) and the dissociated experience 
(Kihlstrom, 1992) explanations, participants actively engage in efforts to enact suggestions. 
In conuast, according to the dissociated control account (Woody and Bowers, 1994), 
hypnotic responding requires no such effort. In the fint two studies, hem rate was 
employed as a measure of cognitive effort that was independent of participants' verbal 
reports in an attempt to determine if amnesic participants actively engage in efforts to 
forget following a suggestion for amnesia, as compared to those who do not experience 
suggested amnesia. 
According to the both the sociocognitive @panos, 1986) and dissociated experience 
(Kihlstrom, 1992) accounts, task-relevant thoughts and imagery are an important 
determinant of hypnotic responding, whereas according to the dissociated control account 
such thoughts and imagery are not necessaiy for hypnotic ~sponding (Hargadon et al., 
1995). In order to determine whether or not task-relevant thoughts and imagery are an 
important determinant of suggested amnesia, in Siudy Three the effects of a standard 
suggestion for amnesia was compared to a condition in which participants were prevented 
from engaging in task-relevant thoughts and imagery. 
Finally, according to the dissociated control account (Woody and Bowers, 1994), 
hypnotic responding is characterized by the dissociation of higher-level executive control 
functions from lower functions and therefore hypnotized participants should show the same 
sorts of memory deficits as frontal lobe patients in the absence of a direct suggestion for 
amnesia (Woody and Bowers, 1994). Thus, in Study Four the performance of hypnotized 
and non-hypnotized participants was compared on a number of memory tasks thought to be 
sensitive to frontal lobe functioning (Shimamura, 1995). 
Study One 
Introduction 
According to both the sociocognitive (Spanos, 1986) and the dissociated experience 
(Kihlstrom, 1992) explanations, participants with high hypnotic ability actively engage in 
efforts to enact suggestions. In contrast, according to the dissociated control account 
(Woody and Bowen, 1994), hypnotic responding requires no such effort. One way to study 
the role of cognitive effon in responding to hypnotic suggestions would be to simply ask 
participants to retrospectively report about the degree to which they were trying to enact the 
suggestion. However, as mentioned previously, there are good reasons to believe that such 
reports can misrepresent whether or not cognitive work occua. For example, advocates of 
the sociocognitive position argue that the passive or non-volitional expenencing of 
suggested amnesia is due to an attributional error that is largely the result of the contextual 
demands of the hypnotic situation (Kirsch and Council, 1992). In contrast, according to 
dissociated control theory, subjective reports can be distorted in the opposite direction, 
insofar as hypnotized participants mistakenly attribute their response to a suggestion to 
some effort on their part or to task-relevant thoughts and images which occur following the 
suggestion for amnesia. Because subjective reports can be problematic in the context of 
hypnosis, it was decided to employ heart rate (Lacey, 1967) as a measure of cognitive effort 
that was independent of participant's verbal reports in an attempt to determine if amnesic 
participants actively engage in effon to forget following a suggestion for amnesia, as 
cornpared to those who do not experience suggested amnesia. 
Study One was designed as a simple conuol experiment in which the Recall 
Organization Paradigm as descnbed by Davidson and Bowen ( 199 1 )  was employed to 
check to see if instructions to participants which ask them to try to forget result in an 
increase in cognitive effort and a concomitant increase in hem rate over and above any 
cognitive effort participants might engage in while simply waiting to recall the list again. 
Study One was conducted outside the context of hypnosis with participants unselected for 
hypnotic ability because it seemed important to detemùne if heart rate was a reasonable 
measure of the cognitive effort involved in trying to forget outside of the context of 
hypnosis before attempting to study the phenornena in the hypnotic context. 
Following learning a list of categorized words to cnterion. half of the participants 
were instructed to simply wait for a half a minute or so (Control). after which time they 
were asked to recall the list again. The other half of the participants were asked to try to 
forget the words from one of the categories during the waiting period (Forgetting). Hem 
rate was periodically monitored in order to compare the heart rate of the two groups during 
the waiting period. 
Fortunately, Spanos (1986) is quite clear about what participants are doing 
following suggestions for amnesia from the sociocognitive perspective. According to 
Spanos (1986). during the waiting period participants are "putting" the targeted words "out 
of mind" by selectively rehearsing the words from the other categories. It was therefore 
relatively easy to create a set of instructions for participants in the Forgetting condition, 
which encouraged hem to attempt to forget the target words in a manner consistent with 
sociocognitive thecry. 
The choice of hem rate as an independent measure of cognitive effort was based on 
previous evidence that heart rate reliably increases with cenain kinds of cognitive effort 
(Lacey, 1967). Kagûn, Lacy and Moss ( 1963) and Lacy and Lacy ( 1970) have reported that 
hem rate increases when participants are asked to engage in cognitive activities such as 
mental arithmetic. In addition, heart rate increases as a function of task difficulty when 
participants are asked to repeat digits backwards (Scher, Furedy and Heselgrave, 1984). 
perform mental arithmetic (Ginsberg, Heselgrave, Scher, Wong and Furedy, 1980; Carroll, 
Turner and Hellawell ( 1986) and generate imagery (Kahneman, Tursky, Shapiro and 
Crider, 1969). Moreover, these effects have been readily demonstrated with relatively small 
smple sizes ( 14 - 24 participants). For example, Scher and Heselgrave (1 984) adrninistered 
two levels of difficulty of a backward digit span task to 16 subjects and found that hem 
rate accelerations during the 15-second cognitive manipulation intervals were greater on the 
difficult trials than on the easy triais. In a similar experiment with 14 participants, 
Ginsberg, Heselgrave, Scher, Wong, and Furedy (1980) found that hem rate increased 
significantiy as a function of task difficulty. Finally, Carroll, Turner, and Hellawell(1986) 
found a significant relationship between task difficulty and heart rate 
acceleration by administering cognitively challenging tasks to 24 participants. On the bais 
of the reliability of the above findings, hem rate has previously been employed as a 
measure of cognitive effort in studies of the relationship between hypnotic ability, imagery 
and cognitive effort (Rothmar, 1986; Hughes, 1988). 
Predictions 
There were two purposes to this initial investigation. First, there was interest in the 
possibility of using hem rate as an independent measure of cognitive effort (Lacey. 1967) 
in the context of trying to forget. The second purpose of Study One was to atternpt to uack 
the relationship between hem rate increase and participants' reports of their experience 
following instructions to try to forget. There were three main predictions for Study One: 1) 
It was predicted that for al1 participants hem rate would increase over baseline dunng the 
leaming trial in a manner consistent with participants working to remember the list of 
words. (2) It was predicted that while the heart rate of participants in the Forgetting 
condition would increase dunng the waiting period in a manner consistent with trying to 
forget, the hem rate of participants in the Control condition would not. (3) Although 
relying on subjective reports in the context of hypnosis may be problematic, it was 
predicted that outside of the context of hypnosis the subjective ratings of effort of 
participants in the Forgetting condition would be correlated with the heart rate measure 
during the waiting penod. 
Method 
Partici~ants 
Forty-six participants unselected for hypnotic abiiity were randomly selected from 
the Psychology 101 Subject Pool. Participants were contacted by phone and asked to 
panicipate in study of hem rate and memory. 
Amaratus 
Participants were seen individually in a testing room, which contained a 
cornfortable chair for the participant, a chair for the expenmenter and a table for the 
electronic equipment. Heart rate was monitored using a Polar Vantage XL telerneuy heart 
rate monitor. Participants were instructed how to place the chest band around their chest in 
such a way that the eiectrode transmittea are positioned on the lower right and left rib cage. 
The wristwatch receiver was then placed on the table between the expenmenter and the 
participant in such a way that the expenmenter could demark certain intervals during the 
experiment. The receiver was set to monitor the participant's heart rate every 5 seconds 
during the entire expenment. After the experiment was completed, the heart rate data were 
downloaded from the receiver to a PC for analysis. 
Procedure 
Participants were telephoned and invited to panicipate in a study of heart rate and 
memory. In order to ensure a reliably low resting baseline heart rate measure, at the 
beginning of the experiment participants were asked to close their eyes and received 
instructions for progressive muscle relaxation after Boume (199 1). Following progressive 
muscle relaxation, a 30 second baseline hem rate measure was taken. Participants then 
were administered the Recdl Organization task. Participants were read a sixteen item, four 
category word list (Davidson and Bowers, 1991). The words in the list are the following: 
nim. whiskey, vodka and beer (alcoholic beverages); robin. crow, sparrow and eagle 
(birds); rose, daisy, orchid and tulip (flowers); and table, chair, sofa and bed (fumiture). A 
senes of randomized list orders was generated, with the restriction that no two words from 
the sarne category nor two words with the same first letter appeared in succession 
(Davidson and Bowers, 199 1). The resulting word Iists were presented aurally at the rate of 
2 seconds per word, and the presentation of each list was followed by a 60 second recall 
period. During the second recall trial, when participants might reasonably be assumed to be 
trying to remember the list of words, a second heart rate recording was made (Leaming 
Trial). When participants had comctly repeated the list twice in succession, they received 
either the Control or Forgetting instructions. In the Control condition, participants received 
the following instructions: 
You have attended well to the task and learned the list of words. In a few 
moments, 1 am going to ask you to recail the list of words again. Just wait 
until you hear me Say begin and then recall the list of words again. ... Wait 
about half a minute, until you heu me Say "begin" before you recall the list 
of words again. ... 
In the Forgetting condition, participants were asked to try to forget al1 of the words 
in one of the categones on the list (the birds) with the following instructions: 
You have anended well to the task and leanied the list of words. ... Wait 
about half a minute. until you hear me Say "begin" before you recall the list 
of words. In a few moments, 1 am going to ask you to recall the list of words 
again. However, until then, try to forget the birds you've just rnemorized. Try 
to forget the birds you've just memorized untilI say "Now you c m  
remember everything." Until that time. try to make your memory for birds a 
blank. Try to make it seem as if you haven't forgotten anything. using the 
words you do remember to cover up and heal any wounds in your 
mernory--so that the words you do recall are enough. Try to forget that you 
have forgotten anything at dl. Wait until you hear me Say "begin" and then 
recdl the rest of the words. 
Following these instructions, participants' hem rate was recorded for 30 seconds 
during the waiting period. Following the waiting penod. participants were asked to recall 
the list (Amnesia Trial). Immediately following the Amnesia Trial, participants were asked 
to recall the entire list one last time. 
Following the final recall trial, participants in both conditions were asked to 
complete a brief Experiential Questionnaire (Appendix A). Based on the subjective reports 
of pilot participants. the Experiential Questionnaire for participants in the Forgetting 
condition included questions which asked participants to rate their experience of the 
instructions, waiting period and the amnesia trial on ten-point scales in a number of ways, 
including: 
a) The degree to which they were confused during the instructions; 
b) The degree to which they were trying to remember the birds dunng the waiting period; 
e) The degree to which they were vying to forget the birds during the waiting period; 
f )  The degree to which they felt that they had forgotten some of the words during the 
amnesia triai; and; 
g) The degree to which they were trying to remember dunng the amnesia trial. 
Participants in the Control condition completed the same questionnaire as 
participants in the Forgetting condition. except that the Expenential Questionnaire for 
participants in the Control condition did not include questions with any reference to trying 
to forget the birds. since they received no such instructions. 
Results 
As expected, the results of a series of one-way ANOVAs revealed no significant 
differences between participants in the Control and Forgetting conditions in either number 
of trials to critenon for leaming the iist, or the nurnber of target words forgotten dunng the 
Amnesia trial. The remainder of the results section has been organized in the following 
rnanner. Initially, the results pertaining to heart rate are presented, followed by analyses 
examining the relationship between heart rate and the subjective ratings. 
Heart Rate 
The h e m  rate data presented in Table 1 was initially ûnalyzed by performing a two- 
way repeated rneasures ANOVA. with condition (Control vs. Forgetting) as a between- 
subjects factor and interval (Baseline, Learning. Waiting) as a within-subjects factor 
(Appendix B). Subsequent cornparisons were then made using Bonferroni corrected t-tests. 
An alpha level of -05 was used for al1 statistical tests. The results of the ANOVA indicated 
a significant main effect for interval, F (2,88) = 66.08, g < .01. However. for interpretive 
purposes this main effect was superseded by a significant interaction of condition by 
interval, F (2.88) = 15.16, <. 01. 
To undentand the 2-way interaction, it is helpful to consider the Control and 
Forgetting conditions sepanitely. In the Forgetting condition, heart rate was significantly 
elevated over baseline dunng both the learning triai, ! (22) = 7.84, g < .O 1, and the waiting 
period. 1 (1.22) = -8.69, p < .O 1. In contmst. in the Control condition, heart rate was 
siWcantly elevated dunng the leaming trial, 1 (22) = 6.53, g < .01, but not during the 
waiting period. In addition, during the waiting period, the hem rate of participants in the 
Forgetting condition was significantly higher (8 1.39, 10.08) than that of participants in 
the Control condition (73.47, 7.66). As expected, there were no differences between 
the two conditions during the baseline or leaming trial intervals. 
Table i 
Average Heart Rate Across Baseline. Learning and Waiting Intervals for Participants in the 
Control and Forgetting Conditions 
Condition 
- - 
Control Forgetting 1 












Note . ** E = < .01. 
Subiective Ratinas 
The data from the Expenential Questionnaire is presented in Table 2. Considenng 
first the subjective experience of participants during the instructions, a one-way ANOVA 
revealed that participants in the Forgetting condition were no more confused during the 
instructions than were participants in the conirol condition. Such a result seems to indicate 
that participants in the Forgetting condition understood what they were supposed to be 
doing during the subsequent waiting period. 
Considering next the subjective reports from the waiting penod, a one way ANOVA 
revealed that participants in the Control condition, on average, nted themselves as trying 
harder to remember during the waiting penod, as compared to participants in the Forgetting 
condition. This result makes sense, given that participants in the Forgetting condition were 
instmcted to try to forget. while participants in the Control condition might be expected to 
use the opportunity provided by the waiting period to try to remember the target words. 
Finally. considering the results of the amnesia trial. there were no differences between 
groups in reports of the extent to which participants felt as if they had forgonen some of the 
words or the degree to which they were trying to remember during the amnesia trial. 
Table 2 
Average Ratings of Subjective Experience for the Control and Forgetting Conditions 
Condition 
Subjective Rating Control Forgetting F 
Confused During Instructions 
Trying to Remember During 
Waiting/ Forgetting Period 
Forgot Sorne Words 
During Amnesia Trial 
Trying to Remember 
During Amnesia Trial 
M - 6.47 5.43 
SD - 2.06 2.37 
Note . ** g c .01. 
Correlations of Subiective - Ratings with Heart Rate 
In the Forgetting condition, participants' ratings of the degree to which they felt as 
if they were trying to forget during the waiting period were significantly correlated with the 
hem rate rneasure, g = .6 1.2 <.O 1. In contrast. in the Control condition. participants' 
ratings of the degree to which they were trying to remember dunng the waiting period were 
not significantly correlated with the hem rate measure, 1 = .30, g = n.s.. While these 
correlations were not found to be significantly different from each other after applying 
Fischer's r to z transformation (Howell, 1987), it is clear that the correlation between the 
heart rate measure and the subjective rating is significant in the Forgetting condition but not 
in the Control condition. This result is not particularly surprising, given that participants in 
the Control condition were not insuucted to "do" anything at dl. It may also be important 
to note that for participants in both conditions, participants' ratings of confusion during the 
instructions were not correlated with hem rate during the subsequent waiting period. Thus. 
the hem rate increase over baseline observed dunng the waiting penod for participants in 
the Forgetting condition was likeiy not due to confusion about the task at hand or some 
other similar confounding variable, such as anxiety. 
Discussion 
Consistent with heart rate k ing  a reasonable measure of cognitive effort, the heart 
rate of d l  participants was significantly elevated over the baseline measure when they were 
trying to l e m  the list of words. More imponantly, participants in Study One who were 
instnicted to try to forget in a manner consistent with sociocognitive theory (Spanos, 1986) 
showed an increase in heart rate relative to the baseline measure, whereas participants who 
received instructions to simply wait for the subsequent recall trial did not. In addition. when 
participants in Study One were asked to try to forget, their self-report ratings of effort 
showed a significant cornlation with heart rate dunng the waiting period following the 
instructions. 
Given the data from Study One, one can conclude that participants who engage in 
an effonful attempt to forget consistent with the sociocognitive account of suggested 
arnnesia dernonstrate an increase in heart rate consistent with that effon and their subjective 
experience of that effon. Moreover, it seems quite clear that participants who try to forget 
in a manner consistent with sociocognitive theory (Spanos. 1986) do not experience 
anything like suggested amnesia. These findings seemed to indicate a great deal of promise 
for using hem rate as a measure of cognitive effort as a way of determining if participants 
in a hypnotic context work to achieve suggested amnesia, as proposed by the sociocognitive 
(Spanos, 1986) and dissociative experience (Kihistrom, 1994) models, or if suggested 
amnesia is experienced in a relatively effonless way more consistent with dissociated 
control (Woody and Bowers, 1994). 
Study Two 
htroduc tion 
There were two purposes to Study Two. First, given the promising results of Study 
One, there was interest in using hem rate as a measure of cognitive effort in order to 
determine whether or not participants who experience hypnotically suggested amnesia work 
to achieve it, as predicted by both the sociocognitive (Spanos, 1986) and dissociative 
experience (Kihlstrom, 1992) models of hypnosis. According to the sociocognitive and 
dissociated experience accounts, participants with high hypnotic ability expenence amnesia 
in a recall organization experiment such as Study One because they work to forget the 
target words during the waiting period and amnesia trial using task-relevant thoughts and 
imagery, whereas participants with low hypnotic ability do not. From such a perspective, 
one might expect that in the context of the recall organization paradigm, the extra effort of 
participants with high hypnotic ability would resuit in elevations of heart rate above 
baseline and relative to participants with low hypnotic ability. In contrast, according to the 
dissociated control account (Woody and Bowers, 1994), participants' experience suggested 
amnesia via processes of dissociated control-i.e. automatically and effortiessly. Thus, 
participants with high hypnotic ability would not be expected to be working any more than 
participants with low hypnotic ability to forget during the waiting period and amnesia triai. 
and one would expect no increases in hem rate for participants with high hypnotic ability 
during those intervals. 
The second purpose of Study Two was to attempt to track the relationship between 
hem rate and participants' subjective reports of their experience during the waiting period 
immediately following the suggestion for amnesia and the amnesia trial. As rnentioned 
previously, there are good reasons to believe that such subjective reports can misrepresent 
whether or not cognitive work occun (Woody, Bowers and Oakman, 1992). However, the 
three available explanations of hypnotic nsponding suggest quite different predictions 
about the direction in which subjective reports of hypnotized participants are likely to be 
distorted. Consider first participants' subjective reports of the degree to whxh they are 
active in trying to enact the suggestion for amnesia. According to the sociocognitive 
(Spanos, 1986) and dissociative expenence (Kihlstrom, 1992) accounts, hypnotized 
participants tend to underestimate and under-report the amount of effon they engage in 
when enacting a suggestion, due to either contextual demands (sociocognitive) or 
misattribution due to the existence of an amnestic bmier (dissociated expenence). As a 
result, if asked to describe their experience of the waiting penod following the suggestion 
for amnesia, one might expect participants with high hypnotic ability to describe a less 
"active" and more "passive" experience, as compared to participants with low hypnotic 
ability. 
In contrast, recall that according to the dissociated control (Woody and Bowers, 
1994; Hargadon et al.. 1995) account, hypnotic suggestions work by directiy and 
automatically activating lower level cognitive subsystems, with the implication that 
executive initiative, effon and control are bypassed and routinized behaviours are run-off 
without volitional control and effort. In summary, according to Davidson and Bowers 
(1991), participants can become amnesic without any executively willed intention to do so. 
However, participants may mistakenly attribue their amnesia to some effort on theù part or 
to task-relevant thoughts and images that occur following the suggestion for amnesia and 
therefore overestimate and over-reoort the degree to which they are actively engaged in 
enacting a suggestion. As a result, if asked to descnbe their expenence following the 
suggestion for amnesia. one might expect participants with high hypnotic ability to report a 
more "active" and less "passive" expenence, as compared to participants with low hypnotic 
ability. 
Considenng next participants' subjective reports of the degree to which they are 
trying to remember dunng the arnnesia trial, once again the three available theories of 
hypnotic responding suggest quite different predictions about the direction in which 
participants' subjective reports are likely to be distorted. According to the sociocognitive 
model, participants with high hypnotic ability might be expected to be working hard to 
forget during the amnesia trial, but would also be expected to report that they are trying 
hard to remember, as compared to participants with low hypnotic ability due to the 
contextual demands of the situation (Spanos, 1986; Kirsch and Council, 1992). From the 
dissociated expenence perspective. one would also expect participants with high hypnotic 
ability to report trying hard to remember. as compared to participants with low hypnotic 
ability. Recall that according to the dissociated experience account, what is dissociated 
from consciousness during hypnosis. presumably because of an arnnestic barrîer, is the 
effort and control required to produce the suggested state of affain. In short, according to 
the theory of dissociated expenence, the production of hypnotic behaviour. including 
task-relevant thoughts and imagery, is effoaful but awareness of the self-mediated nature of 
the experience is not available to consciousness. However, insofar as participants with high 
hypnotic ability are aware of engaging in cognitive effort during the amnesia trial. they are 
Iikely to misattribute that effon as an effon to remember, rather than as an effon to forget 
the target words. As a result, they might be expected to report trying hard to remember 
during the amnesia triai. as compared to participants with low hypnotic ability, who easily 
recall al1 of the words. In sumrnary. according to borh the sociocognitive and dissociated 
conuol accounts. participants with high hypnotic ability should overestimate the degree to 
which they try to recall the target words during the recall triai. and therefore descnbe 
themselves as trying harder to remember during the amnesia trial. as compared to 
participants with low hypnotic ability. 
In contrast. according to the dissociated control model, because of the proposed 
effects of hypnosis on executive functioning, participants with high hypnotic ability are 
unlikely to spontaneously initiate and maintain an effort to nmember the targeted material 
during the amnesia triai. Thus. according to the theory of dissocisted control, participants 
with high hypnotic ability are unlikely to spontaneously report that they were trying hard to 
remember during the amnesia trial, even if they report that they know or "feel" that 
"something is rnissing." As a result, one might expect participants with high hypnotic 
ability to report trying no harder to remember dunng the amnesia trial than participants 
with low hypnotic ability. 
In summary, the second purpose of Study Two was to attempt to determine if 
hypnotized participants' subjective reports are correlated with an independent measure of 
cognitive effort (heart rate) and whether participants with high hypnotic ability tend to 
under or over-estimate the degree to which they are active in enacting the suggestion and 
atternpting to recall the target words, as compared to participants with low hypnotic ability. 
In Study Two, participants with high and low hypnotic ability participated in a 
Recall Organization experiment as described by Davidson and Bowen (199 1). As in Study 
One. throughout the experirnent. participants' heart rate was penodically monitored. In 
addition to the three heart rate measures taken in Study One (baseline. leaming, waiting). in 
Study Two participants* heart rate was monitored throughout the amnesia triai. 
In order to better understand participants' experience of the suggestion for amnesia, 
and to give participants the opportunity to describe their experience in their own words, 
following the cancellation of the suggestion and the termination of hypnosis, they were 
asked to describe their experience of the suggestion by answenng the following questions: 
1) What was the experience of king asked to forget like for you?; 2) What was going 
through your mind after 1 asked you to forget, Le. during that 30 second waiting period?; 
and 3) Did you feel like you had really forgotten the words that 1 said you would forget? 
Three independent judges were subsequently asked to rate the participants' 
responses to the above questions for the amount of effort and activity reported following 
the suggestion for arnnesia. More specificaily, judges were asked to rate participants' verbal 
responses to the t h e  questions on a scale from one to ten for how passivdactive the 
participant was in trying to forget the target words during the waiting period (Volition), 
with " 1" being very passive and "10" being very active; the degree to which the participant 
reported feeling that hehhe had really forgotten the target words (Awareness), with "1" 
being bbcompletely forgotten" and "10" king "completely awan" of the target word; and 
the degree to which the participant trieci to lemember during the amnesia trial (Recd 
Effort), with " 1" indicating not at al1 and "10" trying very hard to remember. In addition, 
judges were asked to make a simple dichotomous decision about whether or not the 
participant reported experiencing task relevant thoughts or imagery following the 
suggestion. 
Predictions 
There were two main purposes to Study Two. First, there was intenst in 
deterrnining if the heart rate of participants with high hypnotic ability following a 
suggestion for amnesia is better predicted by the sociocognitive. dissociated experience. or 
dissociated control account of hypnotic responding. The second purpose of Study Two was 
to examine participants* subjective reports of their expenence of suggestion amnesia in 
order to determine if such reports are distorted in a manner more consistent with the 
sociocognitive. dissociated experience, or dissociated control model. More specifically, the 
purpose of Study Two was to use the Recall Organization paradigrn to test the following 
alternative predictions: 
1) According to both the sociocognitive and dissociated experience accounts. following a 
suggestion for amnesia, the hem rate of participants with high hypnotic ability should be 
significantly higher than the heart rate of participants with low hypnotic ability during 
either the waiting period or the amnesia trial. In contrast, according to the dissociated 
control account, there should be no difference between the hem rate of participants with 
high and low hypnotic ability during either the waiting period or the amnesia trial. 
2) According to both the sociocognitive and dissociated experience accounts, participants 
with high hypnotic ability should be rated as trying less hard to forget (Voiition) during the 
waiting period, and trying harder to remember during the amnesia triai (Recail Effon) as 
compared to participants with low hypnotic ability. In contrast. according to the dissociated 
control account, participants with high hypnotic ability should be rated as trying harder to 
forget (Volition) during the waiting period and trying no harder to remember during the 
m e s i a  via1 ( R e d  Effon) as compared to participants with low hypnotic ability. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants consisted of forty undergraduate students attending the University of 
Waterloo who were preselected for high and low levels of hypnotic ability. Subjects were 
initidly tested in a large group session. using the Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic 
Susceptibility: Form A (Shor and Orne. 1962). This session was followed by a second 
assessrnent conducted in smaller groups of two to ten people, using a group adaptation of 
the Waterloo-Stanford Group C (WSGC) Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility (Bowers, 1993). 
Twenty participants with high hypnotic ability consisted of those who scored nine 
or above and passed the amnesia item on both scales. Twenty participants with low 
hypnotic ability were selected for participation in the study from participants who had 
scored four or below on both scales. The selection of the participants was carried out by a 
research assistant to ensure that the experimenter was blind to each participant's hypnotic 
ability. Three independent judges were recruited from among the graduate students in the 
department for rating the participants' protocols. Instructions to judges for rating the 
protocols are presented in Appendix C. 
A D D ~ ~ ~ ~ u s  
Participants were seen individually in a testing room, which contained a 
cornfortable chair for the participant, a chair for the experimenter and a table for the 
electronic equipment. The method used to collect the heart rate data was sornewhat 
different fiom the method in Smdy One. In Study Two, Medi-Trace Ag/AgCl disposable 
electrodes were placed on the inside of the participants' left wrist and left ankle. Heart rate 
was measured by using a Seimens Sirecast 341 analog hem rate monitor. Average heart 
beat for each interval was calculated by measunng the distance between successive R 
waves on the electrocardiogram paper and converting that measurement to a measure of 
beats per minute (bpm). 
Procedure 
Participants were telephoned and invited to participate in a study of hem rate and 
memory. Participants were informed that the expenment involved an hypnotic induction. 
However, in order to insure that the expenrnenter remained blind to the hypnotic ability, 
participants were asked not to inform the experimenter about their previous expenences 
with hypnosis before the end of the expenment. Participants were adrninistered a standard 
hypnotic induction from the WSGC. Following the induction procedure, a 30 second 
baseline heart rate rneasure was taken. Participants then were adrninistered the R e d 1  
Organization task as in Study One. When participants had comcily repeated the list twice 
in succession, they were asked to forget dl of the birds in the following way: 
You have attended well to the task and learned the list of words. In a few 
moments I am going to ask you to recall the list again. This time, 1 would 
like you to wait a half a minute or so before you recall the list. Wait about 
half a minute. untii you hear me say "begin" before you recail the list of 
words. 
In a few moments, 1 am going to ask you to recali the lisi of words again. 
However, when I do, you will be unable to remember the birds, or any of the 
particular birds you've just memorized. You wili be unable to remember the 
birds or any of the particular birds you've just memorized, until 1 say "Now 
you can remember everything." Until that time, your rnemory for birds will 
just be blank. However, you will have no sense of having forgotten anythmg, 
as if the words you do remember cover up and heal any wounds in your 
memory--that the words you do recall are sufficient. You will not be able to 
rernember that you have forgotten anything at dl. Wait until you hear me say 
"begin" and then recall the rest of the words. 
Immediately following the suggestion for amnesia, heart rate was again recorded for 
30 seconds (Waiting Period). Following the 30 second waiting penod. the experimenter 
initiated the amnesia triai by saying "begin." Heart rate was recorded for the first 30 
seconds of the amnesia trial. Imrnediately following the arnnesia trial the arnnesia 
suggestion was cancelled and the participant was asked to recall the entire list one last tirne 
as follows: 
Now you can remember everything. ... After you hear me Say "begin," I 
would like you to try to recall the entire list one last time. ... Begin. 
Hypnosis was then tenninated using the standard instructions found in the WSGC. 
Results 
Consistent with p s t  research, on average, participants with high and low hypnotic 
ability leamed the list in the same number of trials (M = 7.10, = 1.65 and - M = 7.12. 
= 1.62 respectively), F (1.38) = 0.0 1. g = 0.92 and participants with high hypnotic ability 
recalled vinually none (M = 0.50. = 0.5 1) of the 4 target words, whereas participants 
with low hypnotic ability ncalled virtually al1 of them (M = 3.82, = .41), F ( 1.38) = 
523.26, p < .O 1. 
Heart Rate 
The hem rate data presented in Table 3 was initially analyzed by performing a two- 
way mixed-mode1 ANOVA, with hypnotic ability (High vs. Low) as a between-subjects 
factor and interval (Baseline. Leming, Waiting, Arnnesia) as a within-subjects factor. 
Subsequent cornparisons were then made using Bonferroni corrected t-tests. The results of 
the ANOVA indicated a significant main effect for interval, E (3.114) = 60.49. p c .O01 but 
no main effect for hypnotic ability or interaction between hypnotic ability and interval ' 
(Appendix D). For al1 participants, hem rate was significantly elevated over baseline 
dunng the learning trial, 1 (39) = 1 1.34, g c .001. waiting period, i (39) = - 5.69. g < .001. 
and amnesia trial, 1 (39) = 10.00, g c .ûûL. However, there were no significant between- 
group differences in heart rate during the baseline, waiting period, and amnesia trial 
intervals. although participants with high hypnotic ability tended to have a higher heart rate 
than participants with low hypnotic ability dunng the leanhg trial, t (38) = -2.01, g = .052. 
' The data was also analyzed with a repeated measures ANCOVA, using baseline 
heart rate as a covariate to conml for differences in resting hem rate. The results indicated 
a significant main effect for interval E (2.76) = 28.98, p < .01, but no main effect for 
hypnotic ability, and no interaction between hypnotic abiiity and interval. 
Table 3 
Average H e m  Rate Across Intervals for Participants with Hieh and Low Hwnotic Abiiity 
Hypnotic Ability 
Highs 
n = 20 -
Lows 
n = 20 -












Note . * 2 = 0.05. 
Reliabilitv of Jud~es '  Ratings 
For the cdculation of the inte judge reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) for the four 
questions. participants with high and low hypnotic ability were considered together. Judges 
were able to agree about whether or not participants reported experiencing task-relevant 
thoughts or imagery (1 .O). what participants reported doing following the suggestion 
(Volition) (.68). whether or not they felt like they had forgotten the target words 
(Awareness) (.83). and the degree to which they appeared to be trying to remember the 
target words (Recail Effort) (.76). 
Judees' Ratines of Exuenence of Suggested Amnesia 
The results of a senes of one-way ANOVAs of the average of judges' ratings are 
presented in Table 4. Most participants, whether high or low in hypnotic ability, reported 
experiencing task relevant thoughts and imagery during the waiting period and there was no 
significant difference between the two groups on this rating. However, as expected, 
participants with high hypnotic ability were rated as having a more compelling experience 
of amnesia (Awareness) than were participants with low hypnotic ability. in addition, 
participants with high hypnotic ability were more likely to be rated as actively "doing" 
sornething to forget the targeted words (Volition) as compared to participants with low 
hypnotic ability. Finally, although participants with high hypnotic ability were rated as 
being somewhat aware of the targeted material (Awareness), on average they were judged 
to be trying no harder to remember during the amnesia trial (Recall Effo~t) than participants 
with low hypnotic ability. 
Table 4 
Average Ratings of Task-Relevant Thoughts and Imagew, Volition. Awareness, and Recall 
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Note . **p<.01. 
Correlations of Judges' Ratin~s with the Heart Rate Measure 
The correlations between judges' ratings and hem rate during the waiting penod 
and amnesia trail are reported below. In these analyses. corresponding baseline hem rates 
were used as a covariate in order to control for baseline differences in heart rate and allow a 
more powerful test of the effects of hypnotic ability. Considering the waiting penod fint, as 
cm be seen in Table 5, for participants with low hypnotic ability. the average of judges' 
ratings of cognitive effort (Volition) is moderately well correlated with the proposed 
independent measure of cognitive effort dunng the waiting penod. In contrast, for 
participants with high hypnotic ability, there was vinuaily no correlation between the 
average Volition ratings and hem rate dunng the waiting period. As might be expected, the 
difference between the correlations for participants with high and low hypnotic ability was 
found to be significantly different, &= 2.45, Q < .OS, after applying Fischer's _r to z 
transformation (HowelI, 1987). The lack of a correlation between the judges' ratings and 
the hem rate measure for participants with high hypnotic ability suggests that in contrast to 
the reports of participants with low hypnotic ability, the subjective rcports of cognitive 
effort for participants with high hypnotic ability may be quite inaccurate with respect to the 
independent measure. For neither participants with high nor low hypnotic ability was there 
a significant relationship between heart rate during the waiting penod and ratings of 
Awareness during the amnesia trial. 
Table 5 
Correlations of Judnes' Ratings of Volition. Awareness and Effort wirh Hem Rate During 
the Waiting Period Adiusted for Baseline Heart Rate 
Fieart Rate 
Rating Highs Lows 
Volition -. 16 .59 ** 
Awareness .36 .2 1 
R e d  
Effort 
Note . *g<.05. * * ~ < . 0 1 .  
Considering next the amnesia trial, as can be seen in Table 6, for participants with 
low hypnotic ability, judges' ratings of Volition following the suggestion for amnesia were 
significantly comlated with heart rate dunng the amnesia trial. However, for participants 
with high hypnotic ability, there was no relationship between those variables. Once again, 
the difference between the comtations for participants with high and low hypnotic ability 
was found to be significantîy different, z = 1.98, p c .OS, after applying Fischer's 1 to g 
transformation (Howell, 1987). 
There was no significant correlation between the hem rate measure during the 
amnesia trial and judges' ratings of the degne to which participants seemed to have a 
cornpelling expenence of amnesia (Awareness) for either participants with high or low 
hypnotic ability. Finally, There was no significant correlation between the hem rate 
measure during the amnesia trial and judges' ratings of the degree to which participants 
seemed to be trying to remember during the recall trial (Recall Effort) for either participants 
with high or low hypnotic ability 
Table 6 
Correlations of Judees' Ratines cf Volition. Awareness and Effort with H e m  Rate During 
the Waiting Period Adiusted for Baseiine Heart Rate 
Heart Rate 
Rating Highs Lows 
Volition .13 .67 ** 
Awareness .27 .O7 
Recall 
Effort 
Note . * * e c  .01. 
Discussion 
Study Two provided two findings to support the claim that hem rate is a useful 
index of cognitive effort in this context. Fiat. as in Study One, heart rate vmied across the 
intervals in a manner consistent with the assumption that heart rate increases with cognitive 
effort. Hem rate for al1 participants was significantly elevated over the baseline during the 
learning trial, consistent with the notion that al1 participants were trying to leam the list at 
that time. A second finding in support of the claim that heart rate provides an index of 
cognitive effort in this context was the moderately high comlations between heart rate 
during the waiting period and iunnesia trial and judges' ratings of cognitive effort 
(Volition) for participants with low hypnotic ability. In summary, ai least for participants 
with low hypnotic ability, the data reveal a relationship between the cardiac indicator and 
judges' of cognitive effort in this context (Hughes, 1988). 
As predicted by al1 three models, hem rate for al1 participants increased over 
baseline dunng the learning trial in a manner consistent with participants working to 
remember the list of words. It is interesting that there appeared to be a nearly significant 
trend for participants with high hypnotic abiiity to have a higher hem rate than participants 
with low hypnotic ability during the learning trial. From the sociocognitive and dissociative 
experience accounts one could interpret this result as evidence that hypnotized participants 
work harder than participants with low hypnotic ability in the contexi of hypnosis. 
However, such an explanation falls a bit Bat when considered in light of the heart rate data 
from the waiting period and amnesia trial. In short, it is unclear why according to the hem 
rate measure, hypnotized participants would try harder than participants with low hypnotic 
ability to remember during the learning trials, but not try harder to forget dunng the waiting 
penod and amnesia trails. 
Frorn the dissociated control perspective there are at least two possible explanations 
for the hem rate data during the learning uial. The first explanation is that in addition to 
k i n g  a measure of cognitive effort, heart rate is also an indirect measure of anxiety for 
participants with high hypnotic ability dunng the second learning uial, as they anticipate 
having some kind of suange experience. Hughes (1988) has argued that heart rate c m  be an 
indirect rneasure of either anxiety or cognitive effort, depending on the context of the 
experiment. While participants were not informed at the outset of the experiment that they 
would be given a suggestion for amnesia, they were informed that the expenmenter was 
interested in hypnotic ability and memory. Participants in this experiment had had a 
cornpelling experience of suggested amnesia on at least two previous occasions. As a result. 
at l e s t  some may have begun to anticipate a suggestion for a similar experience during the 
leaming trials. The anticipation of such a subjectively compelling experience of suggested 
amnesia. with an implied loss of control over something as fundamental to a sense of "self' 
and autonomy as memoly (Baddeley, 1986), might be expected to produce some 
anticipatory anxiety during the early part of the experiment in participants with high 
hypnotic ability. One might expect this anticipatory anxiety to fade, as participants become 
cornfortable with the list leaming paradigm. 
The second and more likely explanation for the trend for participants with high 
hypnotic ability to have a higher heart rate than participants with low hypnotic ability 
during the second leaming trial is that participants with high hypnotic ability are workiag 
harder than participants with low hypnotic ability to leam the list of words. Such an 
explmation appears to be both partly consistent and partly inconsistent with the dissociative 
control accouni of hypnotic responding. Such a result supports the idea that in the context 
of hypnosis. participants with high hypnotic ability have more difficulty with leaming the 
list of words, due to a difficulty in selecting and verifying memories (Norman and Shallice. 
1986). and consequently have to work harder to remember. However. the heightened hem 
rate of participants with high hypnotic ability during the learning trial may seem 
inconsistent with the idea that one of the effects of hypnosis is a reduction in the initiation 
and maintenance of behaviour. In short, according to the dissociated control account. 
hypnotized participants might not be expected to "try harder" than participants with low 
hypnotic ability (Woody and Bowen, 1994). However, it is interesting to note that in the 
literature on frontal lobe injury and memory, patients with frontal lobe injuries are able to 
l e m  categorized word lists in the same number of trials as control participants. in conuast, 
frontal lobe patients take more trials than control subjects to leam lists of unrelated words 
(Shimamura. 1995). It may be that people with diminished frontal lobe functioning find it 
more difficult than othea to memorize a list of categorized words. However, it may be that 
when the task at hand is memorizing a categorized word list, the word categories provide 
enough extemal structure and cueing to encourage and motivate both frontal lobe patients 
and hypnotired participants to penist in searching for relevant records in memory and, as a 
result, perform as well as control participants. In conuast, in a situation in which a penoa 
with diminished executive hnctioning is not provided with sufficient extemal cues or 
structure, they may not be unable to initiate and maintain a search for related records in 
memory. 
Moving now to the main point of the study, the heart rate data from the waiting 
pied and amnesia trials seems more consistent with the dissociated control mode1 than 
either the sociocognitive or dissociative expenence models. Consistent with the dissociated 
control account. it would appear that participants with high hypnotic ability were working 
no harder to enact the suggestion during the waiting period or amnesia trial than were 
participants with low hypnotic ability. This finding seerns quite inconsistent with the 
sociocognitive and dissociative experience accounts insofar as the nub of both of those 
arguments is that amnesic participants would do something "extra" to forget the targeted 
material following a suggestion for amnesia as compared to non-amnesic participants. Also 
inconsistent with the sociocognitive and dissociated expenence accounts is the finding that 
for neither participants with high nor low hypnotic ability was hem rate during the waiting 
penod correlated with ratings of Awareness. In contrast to what one rnight predict from the 
sociocognitive and dissociated experience perspectives, according to the heart rate measure, 
working harder during the waiting penod did not result in a more subjectively compelling 
experience of amnesia. 
The finding that most participants with high hypnotic ability reported task-relevant 
thoughts and imagery during the waiting period is consistent with al1 three available 
explanations. However. contrary to what the sociocognitive and dissociated experience 
positions might predict. but consistent with dissociated control theory, the experience of 
task-relevant thoughts and imagery is not an important determinant of suggested amnesia. 
Most amnesic (highs) and non-amnesic (lows) participants reported task-relevant thoughts 
and imageiy. However, only participants with high hypnotic ability expenenced suggested 
amnesia. 
From al1 three perspectives. it is not surprising that the judges' ratings of Volition 
and Recall Effon are not comelated with the hem rate measure for participants with high 
hypnotic ability. While participants' reports about what they are experiencing (e.g. thoughts 
or imagery) rnight be quite accurate. their descriptions of the role of these cognitions in 
eliciting suggested behaviour are likely misleading. These data appear to support the idea 
that poples' own perceptions of whether or not they are engaged in any efforthl activity 
may be es2ecially uninformed in hypnosis (Lynn and Sivec, 1992; Woody. Bowers and 
Oakman, 1992). 
The judges' ratings of Volition, Awareness and Recail Effort appeared to be more 
nearly consistent with the dissociated control mode1 than either the sociocognitive or 
dissociated experience models. According to the sociocognitive and dissociated experience 
positions, hypnotized participants should report experiences that are consistent with the role 
of a hypnotized penon. Thus. participants with high hypnotic ability should almost 
invariably have been rated as being: 1) passive and non-volitional dunng the waiting 
period; 2) unaware of the targeted material during the amnesia trial; and 3) trying hard to 
remember the targeted material during the amnesia trial. However, such was not the case. 
Participants with high hypnotic ability were rated as being more active than participants 
with low hypnotic ability dunng the waiting penod. at least moderately aware of the 
targeted matenai dunng the amnesia triai, and not trying any harder to mnember than (non- 
amnesic) participants with low hypnotic ability. It seems reasonable to argue ihat if 
hypnotized participants are engaged in either a role enactment (Spanos. 1986) or an 
elaborate act of self-deception (Kihlstrom, 1992), they should report subjective experiences 
that are more consistent with that role or self-deception (Spanos, 1986; Lynn, Rhue and 
Weekes. IWO). 
According to the dissociated control account. hypnotized participants may 
mistakenly attnbute the suggested state of affairs due to task-relevant thoughts and imagery 
that are passively expenenced as the result of suggestions that are part and parcel of 
standard hypnotic suggestions (Hargadon et al.. 1995). Such an explanation accounts for 
why participants with high hypnotic ability were mted as being more active (Volition) in 
attempting to enact the suggestion for amnesia, as compared to participants with low 
hypnotic ability. despite the lack of a difference in hem rate between groups. 
Participants with high hypnotic ability, on average, appeared CO be at least 
sornewhat aware of the targeted material dunng the amnesia trial. This is curious on two 
counts. First, such descriptions of their experience of amnesia seem like a poor role 
enactment or self-deception. Second, to the extent that participants with high hypnotic 
ability know that "something is missing," one might expect thern to be working as hard to 
remember as they would if suffering an embamsing memory slip at a cocktail Party. 
However, even though the participants with high hypnotic ability were generaily aware that 
they were not recalling everything, they were working no harder to remember the targeted 
material than were participants with low hypnotic ability who remembered everyihing. As 
mentioned previously. the lack of initiative and effort observed in the efforts of amnesic 
participants to retrieve the target information during the amnesia trial, even when they 
knew that '3 omething was missing." is consistent with the general lack of spontaneous 
behaviour and initiative often associated with both frontal lobe damage and hypnosis 
(Woody and B o w e ~ ,  1994). Finally, according to Woody and Bowen (1994), hypnotized 
participants' inability to accurately report on their cognitive activity is quite consistent with 
the general lack of "meta-awareness" observed in patients with frontal lobe damage 
(Shimamura, 1995). More specifically, frontal lobe patients are characterized as having 
difficulty with "metamemory," Le., diffîculty in knowing what they know and how best to 
go about accessing that information (Shimamura, 1995). 
The heart rate data from Study One and Study Two certainly seem more consistent 
with the dissociated control mode1 than eiiher the sociocognitive or dissociative experience 
models. However, it could be argued that the results of Study Two are problematic insofar 
as the dissociated control theory appears to be supported by a lack of differences in hem 
rate between participants with high and low hypnotic ability. It may be regarded as 
dangerous to interpret the lack of differences in heart rate between participants with high 
and low hypnotic ability during the waiting penod and argue for the null hypothesis 
(Festinger, 1953, pp 142-143; Wilson and Miller, 1964; Aronson and Carlsmith, 1969, p. 
21). However, Gnenwald (1975) has argued that it is less problematic to argue for the null 
hypothesis if certain conditions are met, including: 1) the use of adequate measures; 2) 
adequate statistical power; and, 3) consistency of the result across studies. With respect to 
the use of adequate measures, as mentioned previously, hem rate has been demonstrated to 
be a reliable measure of cogoitive effort in other contexts, and in both Study One and Study 
Two significantly increased over baseline in a marner consistent with increased e f f o ~  
during the leaming trial. With respect to the issue of adequate statistical power, in the 
context of the sample sizes and significant effects found in previous research. and the 
effects demonstrated in Study One. there were likely enough participants to detect 
meaningful differences in heart rate during the waiting penod between participants with 
high and low hypnotic ability had such differences existed. More specifically, the results 
from Study One provide some evidence of sufficient statistical power in Study Two to 
detect any meaningful hem rate increase over baseline during the waiting period. It seems 
reasonable to assume that the average difference of 8 beats per minute in heart rate 
observed between participants in the Standard and Forgetting conditions dunng the waiting 
period in Study One is a reasonable estimate of the expected difference between 
participants with high and low hypnotic ability during the waiting interval in Study Two if 
participants with high hypnotic ability were trying to forget and participants with low 
hypnotic ability were not. Using a conservative estimate of the standard deviation (10.0) 
of the population from which the samples from Study One were drawn, calculations reveal 
an efTect size of approximately -80 for Study One. and a power calculation reveals that a 
sample size of 13 participants shoufd have been large enough to detect a difference in heart 
rate of sirnilar magnitude between participants with high and low hypnotic ability dunng 
the waiting period in Study Two. In surnmary, Study Two likely had ample statistical power 
to reveal interesthg differences in heart rate between participants with high and low 
hypnotic ability during the waiting period had such differences existed. 
Putting the results of Study One and Study Two together. it would appear that then 
is more evidence in favour of the dissociated control (Woody and Bowen, 1994) as 
compued to either the dissociated expenence (Kihlstrom, 1992) or sociocognitive (Spanos, 
1986) accounts of suggested amnesia. Consistent with hem rate being a reasonable 
measure of cognitive effort in this context, participants in Study One who received 
instructions to try to forget showed an increase in hem rate dunng the subsequent waiting 
period as compared to participants in the waiting condition. Consistent with the dissociative 
control mode1 but neither the sociocognitive nor dissociated experience accounts of 
hypnotic responding. participants in Study Two who received standard instructions for 
selective amnesia did not show an increase in heart rate during the subsequent waiting 
penod as compared to participants with low hypnotic ability. Moreover, it is important to 
note that participants in Study One who were given instructions to try to forget consistent 
with the sociocognitive account of hypnotic amnesia (Spanos. 1986) did not forget the 
target words. While the heart rate data from Study One is consistent with the notion that 
participants in the Forgetting condition were engaged in an active and efforthl atternpt to 
forget the target words, the data from Study Two suggests that participants with high 
hypnotic ability who receive a standard suggestion for amnesia experience the suggestion in 
a manner more consistent with dissociated control theory (Woody and Bowers. 1994). One 
must be drawn towards the conclusion that participants in Study One who received 
instructions to try to forget were doing something quite different in response to those 
instructions than participants with high hypnotic ability in Study Two who received a 
standard suggestion for amnesia. 
The combined results from Study One and Two appear to provide more evidence in 
favour of the dissociated control (Woody and Bowers. 1994) as compared to either the 
dissociated experience (Kihlstrom, 1992) or sociocognitive (Spanos, 1986) accounts of 
suggested amnesia. However, despite the lack of evidence for effortful enactment of the 
suggestion for amnesia for participants with high hypnotic ability. most participants in 
Study Two who experienced suggested amnesia also spontaneously reponed experiencing 
task-relevant thoughts and imagery during the waiting period. While the heart rate data 
would appear to suppon the dissociated convoi (Woody and Bowen, 1994) position, 
experiencing such task-relevant thoughts and imagery is certainly consistent with both the 
sociocognitive (Spanos. 1986) and dissociated expenence (Kihlstrom, 1992) models of 
hypnotic responding. Thus, in Study Three the effecü of a standard suggestion for amnesia 
was compared to a condition in which participants were prevented from engaging in 
task-relevant thoughts and imagery. 
Study Three 
Introduction 
The combined results of Studies One and Two suggest that participants with high 
hypnotic ability who receive a standard suggestion for amnesia experience the suggestion in 
an effortless manner more consistent with dissociated control theory (Woody and Bowen, 
1994) than either the sociocognitive (Spanos, 1986) or dissociated expenence (Kihlstrom. 
1992) accounts. However, most participants in Study Two who experienced suggested 
amnesia also spontaneously reported experiencing task-relevant thoughts and imagery 
during the waiting period. For example, some participants reported "seeing" the words 
arranged neatly in categories in their minds' eye following the learning triais and then 
"watching" the targeted words disappear following the suggestion. While the hem rate data 
would appear to support the dissociated control (Woody and Bowen, 1994) position, 
experiencing such task-relevant thoughts and imagery is certainly consistent with both the 
sociocognitive (Spanos, 1986) and dissociated expenence (Kihlstrom, 1992) models of 
hypnotic responding. 
According to the sociocognitive account (Spanos, 1986; Lynn, Rhue and Weekes, 
1990), following a suggestion for amnesia hypnotized participants actively and 
purposefully try to forget using task-relevant thoughts and imagery. Sirnilarly, according to 
the dissociated experience account (Kihlstrom, 1992). the production of hypnotic behaviour 
is the ~ s u l t  of participants' engaging in task-relevant thoughts and imagery, although 
awareness of the self-mediated nature of the task-relevant thoughts and imagery is not 
available to consciousness (Woody and Bowen, 1994). According to both theories, the 
experience of task-relevant thoughts and imagery is centrally important in hypnotic 
responding. In contrast. according to dissociated control theory. because of the reduction of 
higher-level executive control of behaviour during hypnosis. memones can become 
dissociated from conscious expenence effordessly. in the absence of task-relevant thoughts 
and imagery. From the dissociated control perspective, task-relevant thoughts and imagery 
are passively experienced as the result of the suggestions for task-relevant thoughts and 
imagery that are part and parce1 of standard suggestions for amnesia. However, participants 
may mistakenly attribute their expenence of amnesia to the expenence of task-relevant 
thoughts and imagery. Indeed, there is some evidence that the expenence of task-relevant 
thoughts and imagery is not required for successful hypnotic responding. As mentioned 
previously, according to a recent report of Hargadon et al. (1995). task-relevant thoughts 
and imagery do not enhance hypnotic analgesia for participants with high hypnotic ability. 
Given the compelling results of Hargadon et al. ( 1995). Study Three was designed 
to determine if suggested amnesia cm be achieved by participants with high hypnotic 
ability in the absence of task-relevant thoughts or imagery. In Study Three, participants 
with high and low hypnotic ability participated in an experiment employing the Recall 
Organization paradigm. Hdf of the participants were given oniy the standard suggestion for 
amnesia used in Studies One and Two, and hdf of the participants were asked to engage in 
a distraction task during the waiting period following the suggestion for m e s i a .  
Post-expenmentally, participants completed an Expenential Questionnaire in which bey 
were asked to make a number of ratings declaring the nature of their experience of the 
suggestion for amnesia 
According to both the sociocognitive (Spanos, 1986) and dissociated expenence 
(Kihlstrom, 1992) accounts, preventing participants from engaging in task-relevant 
thoughts and imagery during the waiting period should result in a less compelling 
experience of suggested amnesia. Consistent with this view, participants with high hypnotic 
ability asked to perform the distraction task should report less amnesia compared to 
participants with high hypnotic ability in the standard condition. In contrast. according to 
dissociated control theory (Woody and Bowen, 1994), preventing task-relevant thoughts 
and imagery during the waiting period should not interfere with the experience of suggested 
amnesia for participants with high hypnotic ability. Thus, participants with high hypnotic 
ability asked to perfom a distraction task during the waiting period would be expected to 
have no less a compelling experience of amnesia than participants with high hypnotic 
ability who have the opponunity to experience task-relevant thoughts and imagery during 
the waiting period. Indeed, frorn the dissociated control perspective preventing participants 
with high hypnotic ability from experiencing task-relevant thoughts and imagery during the 
waiting period may result in a more compelling subjective expenence of amnesia as 
compared to participants with high hypnotic ability who receive the standard instructions, 
insofar as participants who perform the distraction task are less likely to (mistakenly) 
attribute their expenence of amnesia to self-generated task-relevant thoughts and imagery. 
In other words, to the extent that standard suggestions encourage participants to actively 
engage in producing task-relevant thoughts and imagery, they may actually interfere with 
hypno tic responding (Hargadon et al., 1995) because a reduction in executive functioning 
would nsult in dificulty initiating and maintainhg such behaviour (Norman and Shallice, 
Predictions 
The main purpose of Study Three was to use the Recall Organization paradigm to 
test the following alternative predictions. According to both the sociocognitive and 
dissociated experience accounts, preventing participants with high hypnotic ability from 
engaging in task-relevant thoughts and imagery following a suggestion for amnesia should 
result in a significantly less compelling experience of amnesia as compared to the 
expenence of participants with high hypnotic ability who receive the standard suggestion 
and are free to expenence task-relevant thoughts and imagery. In contrast, according to the 
dissociated control account, preventing participants with high hypnotic ability from 
engaging in task-relevant thoughts and imagery following a suggestion for amnesia should 
result in an experience of amnesia that is at least as compelling as, or even more compelling 




Twenty participants with high hypnotic ability and twenty participants with low 
hypnotic ability were selected according to the same criteria as in Study Two. 
Apparatus and Procedures 
The materials and procedures were the s m e  as for Study Two, with the following 
exceptions. Fiat, no hem rate measure was taken, because the purpose of the study was to 
simply determine if preventing participants from engaging in task relevant thoughts or 
amnesia would interfere with the experience of amnesia. Second. half of the participants 
with high and low hypnotic ability were assigned to a Distraction condition. The distraction 
task consisted of having participants count backwards from 100 in time with a mevonorne 
set at one beat per second. According to reports pmvided by pilot participants, this simple 
distraction task effectively prevented them from engaging in task-relevant thoughts and 
irnagery, such as selective reheanal of the words not targeted for amnesia. 
Following termination of hypnosis, participants were asked to complete an 
Experiential Questionnaire (Appendix E) in which they were asked to rate their expenence 
of the waiting penod and the amnesia trial on a number of ten-point scales, including: 
a) The degree to which they expenenced task-relevant imagery during the waiting 
(counting) period; 
b) The degree to which they experienced task-relevant thoughts (i.e. thoughts other than 
imagery) during the waiting (counting) penod; 
C) The degree to which they were trying to forget the birds during the waiting (counting) 
period; 
d) The degree to which they felt that they had forgotten the birds; 
e) The degree to which they felt that they had control over rernembering the birds; 
f) The degree to which they were trying to recall the birds during the amnesia trial; 
g) The degree to which they were trying to forget the birds dunng the amnesia triai; 
h) The degree to which they could have recailed the target words if they had trïed harder. 
and; 
i) The degree to which they felt hypnotized during the experirnent. 
Results 
The results of two 2 Hypnotic Ability (high. low) X 2 Condition (standard, 
distraction) ANOVAs of ratings of depth of hypnosis and number of target words recalled 
are presented in Table 7. As expected, there was a significant main effect for hypnotic 
ability for participants' ratings of depth of hypnosis. More imponantly, there was neither a 
main effect for condition nor an interaction between condition and hypnotic ability. 
Participants with high hypnotic ability in the Distraction condition rated themselves as 
being as deeply hypnotized as participants with high hypnotic ability in the Standard 
condition. In both the Standard and the Distraction conditions, participants with high 
hypnotic ability were significantly more amnesic for the target words. as compared to 
participants with low hypnotic ability. Once again, there was neither an effect for condition 
nor an interaction between hypnotic ability and condition. in short. participants with high 
hypnotic ability in the distraction condition were just as amnesic as participants with high 
hypnotic ability in the standard condition, who were free to expenence task-related 
thoughts and imagery following the suggestion for amnesia. 
Table 7 
Depth of Hypnosis Ratings and Number of Target Words Recalled on the Amnesia Trial 
for Participants With High and Low Hypnotic Ability 
Hypnotic Ability 
Highs Lows - F MS Error 
n = 20 - - n = 20 
Depth of 
Hypnosis 
Targe t Words 
Recalled 
- - - 
Note . * * ~ < . 0 1  
Subiective Ex~erience During the Waitina Period 
The results of a senes of 2 Hypnotic Ability (high, low) X 2 Condition (standard, 
distraction) ANOVAs (Appendix F) of participants' ratings of their experience dunng the 
waiting penod following the suggestion for amnesia are presented in Table 8. 
Considering fmt participants' ratings conceming their experience of task-relevant 
imagery and thoughts. participants in the Distraction condition reported much less 
task-relevant irnagery during the waiting period than did participants in the Standard 
condition, (1.39) = 14.00, < .O 1. In addition. there was a significant interaction of 
Hypnotic Ability by Condition. F (1.39) = 5.40, c .05. with participants with high 
hypnotic ability in the Standard condition reporting more task-relevant imagery than 
participants with either high or low hypnotic ability in any other condition. In addition to 
reporting less imagery, participants in the Distraction condition reported fewer task-relevant 
thoughts than participants in the Standard condition. F (1.39) = 2 1.39, g < .O 1. In addition. 
there was a main effect for hypnotic ability, with participants with low hypnotic ability 
tending to report more task-relevant thoughts overdl, as compared to participants with high 
hypnotic ability. F ( 1,39) = 5.2 1, < .OS. 
Turning next to participants' reports of effort during the waiting period, participants 
in the Standard condition were more likely to report that they were trying to remember the 
birds during the waiting (counting) penod, F ( 1 .39 )~  7.62, Q < .01. In addition, there was a 
non-significant trend for participants in the Standard Condition to report that they were 
trying to forget the birds, F (1,39)=, g < .IO. In short, participants in the Standard condition 
were more likely than participants in the Distraction condition to report trying to remember 
(and forget) the birds. 
Table 8 
Subjective Reports bv Hwnotic Abilitv and Condition for the Waiting Period 
Hypnotic Ability 
High Low 
Subjective Report Standard Distraction Standard Distraction 
n =  10 - - n =  I O  - n =  10 - n =  10 






Effon to Forget 
SD -
Effort to Remember 
M - 4.80 1.90 4.50 3.20 
S D  - 3.33 0.74 3.80 3.45 
Subiective Experience During the Amnesia Trial 
The results of a series of 2 Hypnotic Ability (high, low) X 2 Condition (standard, 
distraction) ANOVAs (Appendix G) of participants' ratings of their experience during the 
amnesia trial are presented in Table 9. Consistent with the results of Study Two, 
participants with high hypnotic ability tended to report that they were trying less hard to 
remember during the amnesia trial, (1.39) = 4.97, c .OS, as compared to participants 
with low hypnotic ability. In addition, whüe the effect was not significant, participants with 
low hypnotic ability were somewhat more likely to report trying to forget the birds during 
the amnesia trial, as compared to participants with high hypnotic ability, F (1.39) = 3.28, g 
< .IO, in both the Standard and Distraction conditions. As expected, participants with high 
hypnotic ability in both conditions were more likely to report that they felt as if they had 
forgotten the target words, E ( 1,39) = 12 1.68. g < .O 1, than were participants with low 
hypnotic ability. In addition, the interaction between Hypnotic Ability and Condition 
approached significance, F (1,39) = 3.55, g c .07. Participants with high hypnotic ability in 
the Distraction condition tended to report a more compelling experience of forgetting aç 
compared to participants with high hypnotic ability in the Standard condition. (18) = 1.64, 
e = .12. In contrast. participants with low hypnotic ability in the Distraction condition 
seemed to be reponing a less compelling experience in this regard as compared to 
participants with low hypnotic ability in the Standard condition, f ( 18) = 1.57, Q = .14. 
Table 9 
Subiective Re~orts bv Hwnotic Abilitv and Condition for the Amnesia Trial 
Hypnotic Ability 
High Low 
Subjective Report Standard Dis traction Standard Distraction 
Effort to Forget 
M - 2.30 
SD - 2.16 
Effort to Remember 
M - 4.30 
SD - 3.40 
Felt Like They Forgot 
M - 6.50 
SD - 2.46 
Could Not Have Remembered 
M - 3.80 
SD - 2.62 
Con trol 
M - 4.40 
SD - 2.17 
As expected, participants with high hypnotic ability were more likely to repon thar 
they could not have recailed the target words even if they had tned harder, F ( 1,39)= 67.13. 
ec .O 1. In addition, there was a significant interaction between Hypnotic Ability and 
Condition, _F (1,39)= 7.46, g< . O 5  Participants with high hypnotic ability in the Distraction 
condition tended to report a more compelling expenence in this regard than participants 
with high hypnotic ability in the Standard condition, 1 (18) = 2.84, e c.05. 
Findly, as compared to participants with low hypnotic ability, participants with high 
hypnotic ability in both conditions reported less control of remembenng the targeted words, 
F ( 1,39)= 80.70, Q< .Ol. -
Discussion 
As predicted, the distraction task appeared to effectively prevent participants from 
experiencing task-relevant thoughts and imagery during the waiting penod. Indeed, it 
would appear that the distraction task was especially effective at preventing task-relevant 
thoughts and imagery for participants with high hypnotic ability. It makes some sense that 
participants with high hypnotic ability in the Standard condition reported more 
task-relevant imagery as compared to participants in any other condition. Indeed. such a 
result is consistent with al1 three available explanations of hypnotic responding. As 
expected, participants in the Distraction condition also reported fewer task-relevant 
thoughts as cornpared to participants in the Standard condition. However, there was also a 
main effect for hypnotic ability, with participants with low hypnotic ability tending to 
report more task-relevant thoughts overall, as compared to participants with high hypnotic 
ability. This result is somewhat difficult to interpret, because according to the hem rate 
results from Study Two, participants with low hypnotic ability try no harder to forget than 
participants with high hypnotic ability. However, such a result rnight be taken as further 
evidence that participants with low hypnotic ability are more likely than participants with 
high hypnotic ability to be "thinking" about something dunng the waiting penod as 
cornpared to the more passive expenencing of task relevant imagery by participants with 
high hypnotic abiiity. In ntrospect, one could speculate that the task-relevant thoughts that 
the participants with low hypnotic ability are referring to are relatively effortless musings 
about the nature of the suggestion such as "this stuff never works on me," "this is really 
boring," and " 1 can't believe this works on some people." 
Given the effectiveness of the distraction task in reducing task-relevant thoughts 
and imagery, it is interesting that the subjective experience of participants with high 
hypnotic ability in the Distraction condition was. if anything, more compelling than the 
expenence of participants with high hypnotic ability in the Standard condition. Participants 
with high hypnotic ability in the Distraction condition were more likely to report that they 
could not have remembered the target words even if they had tried harder, as compared to 
participants with high hypnotic ability in the Standard condition. While the difference was 
just shy of statistical significance, participants with high hypnotic ability in the Distraction 
condition tended to report that they felt like they had forgotten the words, as compared to 
participants with high hypnotic ability in the Standard condition. Similarly. while the 
differences between participants with high hypnotic ability in the Standard and Distraction 
conditions in their responses to other items were not significuit. these results also tended to 
suggest that the expenence of arnnesia of participants with high hypnotic ability in the 
Distraction condition was more compelling than the experience of participants with high 
hypnotic ability in the Standard condition. These results seem quite contras, to what would 
be predicted by the sociocognitive (Spanos, 1986) and dissociated experience (Kihlstrom, 
1992) models. They suggest that the task-relevant thoughts and imagery that are often 
expenenced following the standard suggestion for amnesia are not an important 
determinant of suggested amnesia. Consistent with the dissociated conuol (Woody and 
Bowea, 1994) position. it would appear that as for the experience of hypnotic analgesia, 
the opportunity to engage in task-relevant thoughts and imagery may actuaiiy produce a less 
compeliing experience of amnesia (Hargadon et al., 1995). 
The results from Study Three, combined with the results from Studies One and 
Two, suggest that in the absence of task-relevant thoughu, imagery. and cognitive effort, 
following a suggestion for selective amnesia, participants with high hypnotic ability forget 
the target material while participants with low hypnotic ability do not. It would appear that. 
in general, participants with high hypnotic ability do not engage in an active attempt to put 
the targeted material "out of minci" following the suggestion for amnesia. In contnst, 
regardless of their response to the suggestion. participants with low hypnotic ability do not 
become amnesic for the targeted material. 
One could argue that paying any attention to the subjective reports of hypnotized 
participants is problematic. given the lack of a correlation between judges' ratings of effort 
and heart rate for participants with high hypnotic ability in Studies One and Two. However, 
there may be an important difference between hypnotized participants' ability to report on 
what they are experiencing and what they are "doing." For exarnple. it seems reasonable to 
assume that participants can report on whether or not they expenenced task-relevant 
thoughts or imagery, even if they are not very good at reporting about the degree to which 
they were effortfully involved in producing those thoughts and imagery. 
The results presented so far appear to support the theory of dissociated control 
(Woody and Bowers. 1994) account of hypnotic responding over the either sociocognitive 
(1986) or dissociated experience (Kihlstrom, 1992) models. However, one rnight argue that 
evidence against the sociocognitive (Spanos, 1986) and dissociated experience (Kihlstrom, 
1992) positions is not necessarily evidence for the dissociated control (Woody and Bowers, 
1994) position. Fortunately there is a way to put the theory of dissociated control (Woody 
and Bowers, 1994) to a relatively strong test. R e d  that according to most conventional 
accounts of hypnotic responding. including the sociucognitive (Spanos, 1986) and 
dissociative experience accounts (Kihlstrom, 1992). there are no interesting unsuggested 
effects of hypnosis on memory. In contrast. according to the dissociated control perspective 
(Woody and Bowea, 1994). the alteration of underiying control processes that occurs in 
hypnosis should result in certain kinds of unsuggested effecü on memory. More 
specifically according to the dissociated control model, in the context of hypnosis people 
with high hypnotic ability should have dificulty with the rnemory tasks thought to be 
sensitive to impaired frontal lobe functioning (Shimamura, 1995). Thus, Study Four was 
designed to explore ihis prediction by examining the performance of participants with high 




According to two of the three available theones of hypnotic responding, 
sociocognitive theory and the theory of dissociated experience, there are no real underlying 
changes in cognitive control processes during hypnosis, and thus there should be no 
interesting unsuggested effects of hypnosis on memory (KiNstrom and Schacter, 1988). 
According to the sociocognitive account, any purported unsuggested effects of hypnosis on 
memory can be best accounted for by demand and context effects (Spanos, 1986). 
Similady, according to the theory of dissociated experience (Kihlstrom, 1992), any reports 
of unsuggested effects of hypnosis on memory can be best accounted for by subtle and 
perhaps "unspoken" suggestions for rnemory distorrions (Orne, 1962). In contrast, 
according to the dissociated control mode1 (Woody and Bowen, 1996). hypnosis leads to a 
reduction in high-level executive control that is ordinarily responsible for planning. 
initiative and the intentional control of behaviour. From the dissociated control perspective, 
such changes are similar to the changes in executive control observed in patients with 
frontal lobe damage. It follows that hypnotized participants might be expected to 
demonstrate the sarne kind of rnemory difficulties as patients with frontal lobe damage, in 
the absence of direct suggestions for amnesia or mernory distortion. 
The purpose of Study Four was to test the predictions of dissociated control theory 
with respect to the unsuggested effects of hypnosis on memory by comparing the 
performance of participants with high and low hypnotic abiiity on a variety of frontal 
memory tasks. According to the theory of dissociated control, pmicipants with high 
hypnotic ability should have difficulty with such tasks in the context of hypnosis, as 
compared to participants with low hypnotic ability, and participants with high and low 
hypnotic ability outside of the context of hypnosis. 
There appears to be evidence in the data from Studies Two and Three of 
unsuggested effects of hypnosis on memory consistent with dissociated control theory. 
First, in Study Two, participants with high hypnotic ability appeared to be working harder 
to remember the word list during the second learning trial as compared to participants with 
low hypnotic ability. Such a result is certainly consistent with the idea that participants with 
high hypnotic ability have more difficulty with leaming the list of words, perhaps due to a 
difficulty in organizing and accessing memory that is consistent with attenuated frontal 
functioning (Woody and Bowers, 1994). Second. according to both the hem rate measure 
and subjective reports in Study Two and Study Three, participants with high hypnotic 
ability were not trying harder to remember than participants with low hypnotic ability 
during the amnesia trial, even though reported "knowing" or "feeling as if' they were 
forgetting something. Both the experience of amnesia and the relative lack of motivation to 
recdl the "forgotten" information are consistent with the idea that the memory distortions 
and retrieval difficulties observed following suggestions for amnesia resemble the effects of 
frontal lobe damage (Woody and Bowers, 1994). 
While the results of Studies One and Two are interesting, the literature on hypnosis 
and memory contains some other evidence that there are interesting unsuggested effects of 
hypnosis on memory. This evidence is reviewed in the following sections. 
The Standard Scales A~proach 
A number of authorities (Orne, 1962) have reported that people do not experience 
spontaneous amnesia if they are given information that leads them to believe that 
post-hypnotic amnesia only occun following specific suggestions to that effect. In contrast, 
when informed that spontaneous amnesia is the nom. participants with high hypnotic 
ability are amnesic in the absence of specific suggestions to that effect. In light of these 
findings, some (e.g. Spanos, 1986) have argued that the reliable demonstrations of 
spontaneous amnesia documented by the pioneers of hypnosis research can be best 
explained away as the result of the prevailing demand characteristics. As a result. it is a 
well-established wisdom that spontaneous amnesia for the events that occur during 
hypnosis is a relatively rare occurrence (Hilgard and Cooper, 1965; Evans, 1988). 
While most modem hypnosis researchers have found the above results quite 
compelling, there is sorne older evidence for the view that there might be some spontaneous 
recall amnesia following hypnosis (Furneaux, 1946; Hammer, Evans and Bartlett, 1963). 
However, studies that make clairns for unsuggested effects of hypnosis on memory cm be 
criticized on several grounds. First, many of the studies are based on (relatively) small 
samples, which make the results difficult to interpret. Second. it is clear that people can 
forget for different reasons and what appears to be "spontaneous amnesia" might often be 
the result of shifting report criteria (Erdelyi, 1984). Third, it is unclear whether or not 
"spontaneous amnesia" results from panicipants* preconceptions about hypnosis. It may be 
the case that participants display "spontaneous amesia" when the suggestion that hypnosis 
produces spontaneous amnesia is "in the air," or otherwise suggested indirectly by the 
experimenten (Orne. 1962). In addition to such concems, the standard scales approach to 
studying both suggested and spontaneous amnesia is problematic insofar as the pandigm 
employed is somewhat different from most other formal tests of memory. Using the 
standard scales approach, participants are not specifically instmcted to remember the scde 
items at the time they are administered. nor is there any indication that the participants' 
memory for the suggestions will be subsequently tested. 
Reversa1 of Suggested Amnesia and ResiduaI Amnesia 
The reversibility or recovery of forgotten material following the cancellation of the 
suggestion is thought to be centrally important to understanding suggested amnesia (Evans, 
1988; Kihlstrom and Evans, 1976, 1979; Kihlstrom and Registrar. 1984; Nace, Orne and 
Hammer, 1974; Orne, 1966). The observation that participants with high and low hypnotic 
ability recall the sarne number of experiences after amnesia has been lifted (Cooper, 1972; 
Kihistrom and Evans, 1976) is usually taken as evidence that posthypnotic amnesia 
involves an alteration in retrieval from memory store, rather than an alteration in how 
mernories are processed at the time of leaming. Recovery demonstrates that the forgotten 
information was in fact stored in memory and was avaiiable but not accessible when the 
suggestion was in effect (Tuiving and Pearlstone, 1966). 
From time to time people have challenged the notion that recovery following the 
cancellation of the amnesia suggestion is complete (e.g. Hilgard and Hummel, 1961). In a 
devant study, Kihlstrom and Evans (1978) reported that despite significant recovery 
following cancellation of the suggestion for posthypnotic amnesia, the= appeared to be a 
slight deficit in the total nurnber of items recalied by participants who displayed 
posthypnotic amnesia following the suggestion. Furthemore. Kihlstrom and Evans ( 1978) 
reportecl that the "residual amnesia" was not due to either "faking" or a failure of memory 
storage due to such factors as inattention or sleep. Kihlstrom and Evans (1978) concluded 
that suggested arnnesia, when lifted, takes some time to fuliy dissipate. One might be 
tempted by the alternative interpretation, Le. that suggested amnesia results. at least in part, 
from a failure of processing (control) during the hypnosis session. as well as a failure of 
retrieval. 
Memorv Distortion 
Researchers have recentiy become interested in subtle alterations in memory during 
hypnosis, partly as a result of the debate about the role of hypnosis in creating and altering 
memory to produce so-cailed "false memories" (Bowers and Farvolden, 1996; Sheehan, 
1988). According to Woody and Bowen (1994), what has emerged from this literature is 
that in the absence of specific suggestions for amnesia, hypnotized participants "may be 
unable to distinguish me memories from irrelevant associations elicited by stimuli, are 
highiy confident about incorrect memories and are prone to confabulation, especiaily when 
prompted by leading questions" (Woody and Bowers, 1994, p. 71). It was the observation 
of these types of distortions in hypnotized participants which led Woody and Bowea 
( 1994) to liken the unsuggested effects of hypnosis on memory to what Shallice ( 1988) and 
others (Shimarnura, 1995; Shallice, 1988) have termed "frontai amnesia." 
The notion that the unsuggested effects of hypnosis on memory nsemble the 
symptoms of frontal amnesia suggests that hypnotized participants should have difficulty 
with the sorts of memory tasks that are used to distinguish frontal amnesia from other 
amnesic syndromes (Le. temporal lobe problems). Recently. Shimarnura ( 1995) has 
descnbed a variety of such memory tests. What follows is a review of Shimamura's (1995) 
battery of frontal rnemory tasks and a bnef summary of relevant research in hypnosis to 
date. 
New Learning Abilitv and Free Recall 
Patients with frontal lobe lesions are not impaired on most standard tests of new 
leaming ability, in stark contrast to the marked inability of people with lesions of the 
medial temporal lobe and classic antereograde amnesia (Shimamura, 1995). However, 
patients with frontd lobe darnage do show impaired free recall performance for lists of 
unrelated words (DellaRocchetta, 1986; Gershberg and Shimamura, 199 1; Janowsky et al., 
1989; Jetter et al., 1986). Shimamura (1995) has proposed that the impairment in free recall 
observed in frontal lobe patients is due to the demands that such a task places on internally 
generated mernory strategies and effortful search and retneval processes, which is 
consistent with Baddeley's (1986) suggestion that frontal lobe lesions disrupt working 
memory. 
hterestingl y enough, Kihlstmm ( 1980) has reponed that hypnotized participants 
cake significantly more triais to leam a list of 15 unrelated words than do control 
participants. It is interesting to note that Kihlstrorn (1980) did not emphasize this finding in 
his own writing and soon thereafter adopied the Spanos (1980) patadigm, in which 
participants leam categorized word lis&, a task on which both hypnotized participants and 
frontal lobe patients are able to perfonn as weii as controls. 
Proac tive interference 
There is a growing body of evidence to suggest that patients with frontal lobe 
lesions have difficulty ignoring irreievant information in the context of perfonning the 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (Milner, 1982) and the Stroop Test (Perret, 1974). In the 
memory domain, there are a number of tasks designed to assess the impact of prior leaming 
in the leaming of new information and the tem "proactive interference" is used to describe 
the negative effects that prior learning can have on new leaming (Shimamura, 1995). 
Shimamura ( 1995) has reponed that patients with frontal lobe darnage show 
impairment on tests of memory which require participants to inhibit previously leamed 
responses. Shimamura, Janowsky, and Squire (1995) presented participants with an AB-AC 
paired associate leaming task. In this paradigm, participants are fiat presented with three 
leaming triais of a list of 12 related paired associates (e.g. thief-crime; lion-hunter). 
Proactive interference (PI) is produced by having participants then l e m  a second list in 
which each of the cue words from the fust list is paired with a new target word associate 
(e.g. thief-bandit; lion-circus). Shimmura (1995) reported that patients with frontal lobe 
lesions leam the first list nearly as well as control participants, but exhibit significantly 
more impairment than controls when required to ignore the original associations in order to 
l e m  the new ones. 
There has only been one reported study of proactive interference effects following 
an hypnotic induction. Dillon and Spanos (1983) administered a Brown-Peterson (Wickens 
and Gittis. 1974) rnemory task designed to induce proactive interference. Using this 
method, participants were asked to leam 10 blocks of three word lists. Across blocks, all 
words were strongly related, and, therefore, lists presented early interfered with lists 
presented later (PI "buildup"). Dillon and Spanos (1983) reponed that an amnesia 
suggestion did not prevent previously learned material from interfenng with newly 
presented material and that hypnotized participants showed no more PI than unhypnotized 
participants. While this result goes somewhat against the dissociated control model, it is 
important to note thar the Brown-Petenon task is quite different from the paired associate 
task employed by Shimamura et al. (1995). Thus, it seems most reasonable to Say that the 
effects of hypnosis on performance on PI tasks rernains to be explored. 
Word Fluencv and Design Fluencv 
The Word Ruency test is well established as a merisure of left frontal lobe 
functioning, with word fluency to letter designated categories (F, A. S) thought to be more 
frontal than fluency to semantic categories (Shimamura, 1995). Following the method 
described by Benton and Hamsher (1978), participants are given one minute to produce as 
many words as they can that begin with a given letter, for example, "F," and then the same 
task is repeated for one or two more letten, for example, "A" and "S." Performance on the 
task is measured by the total number of words produced across the three trials. Patients with 
left frontal lobe damage demonstrate marked impairment on this task (Janowsky et al., 
1989). Similarly, patients with right frontal darnage have been found to demonstrate poor 
performance on similar Design Fluency tasks which require participants to produce as many 
different designs from a fmed number of standard elements (Jones-Gotman and Milner, 
1977). Shimamura (1995) ha speculated that impairment on tests of word retrieval may be 
related to diffîculties in searching and organizing information in semantic memory. 
Ln the hypnosis literature. Gruzelier and Warren ( 1993) have reponed that 
hypnotized participants show a reduction in word generation to letter categories. no 
significant change in word generation to semantic categories. and an improvement in 
Design Fluency in hypnosis versus a nonhypnotic baseline condition. results which are 
broadly consistent with the hypothesis that hypnotized participants have difficulty in word 
finding that is similar to the anornia observed in patients with left frontal damage. 
However, while hypnotized participants showed some improvement in Design Fîuency in 
hypnosis compared to a baseline condition, their performance remained inferior to that of 
unhypnotized participants across both conditions. Thus. in contrast to the conclusion that 
hypnosis improves Design Ruency (Gruzelier and Warren, 1993). it would appear that 
participants with high hypnotic ability who are not hypnotized demonstrate some 
impairment in Design Ruency. 
Miiner (197 1) has reported that frontal lobe patients exhibit deficits in the temporal 
organization of memory. In one study of recency judgements (Milner, Coni, and Leonard. 
199 l ) ,  participants were shown a series of stimuli, either words or pictures, and 
occasionally asked to make a judgement about which of two stimuli was presented more 
recently. Participants with frontal lobe lesions had dificulty in correctiy identifjang the 
most recently presented stimulus. Using a somewhat different paradigm, Shimamura, 
Janowsky and Squire (1990) have also demonstrated impaired memory for temporal order 
in patients with fiontal lobe lesions. In the Shimamura et al. (1990) study, participants were 
presented with a list of 15 words, one at a time, and then were asked to reconstruct the 
correct list order from a random displq of the stimulus words. Shimamura et al. ( 1990) 
report that patients with frontal lobe lesions exhibited significant impairment on this Word 
Sequencing task as cornpared to control participants. Based on these findings, Shimamura 
(1995) has concluded that patients with frontal lobe lesions demonstrate impaired memory 
for temporal order even when the mernory for the individual items is intact. 
There is considerable evidence that hypnotized participants show impaired temporal 
organization and seriation following suggestions for amnesia. For example, Evans and 
Kihlstrom (1973) demonstrated that the first item recalled by 85% of participants low in 
hypnotic ability was the first scale item administered, whereas only 34% of participants 
with high hypnotic ability recalled the fiat item first. However, the temporal sequence of 
recall for the events of hypnosis has usuaily been investigated by calculating the rank order 
correlation between the order in which participants recall any suggestions and the order in 
which the recalled suggestions are administered (Evans and Kihlstrom, 1973). Using this 
methodolgy it has more often than not been demonstrated that highly hypnotizable 
participants are more likely to recall what they do recall in a more disorganized fashion 
following suggestions for amnesia (Bertrand and Spanos, 1985; Crawford, 1974; Geiselman 
et al., 1983; Kifilstrorn and Wilson, 1984; Lavoie and Sabourin, 1980; Lieberman et al., 
1978; Radtke and Spanos, 198 1; Radtke et al., 1986; Schwam, 1978,1980; Spanos and 
Bodorick 1977; Spanos and D'Eon, 1980; Spanos et al., 1980; St. Jean and Coe, 1981; 
Staats and Evans, 1983). 
The evidence for temporal disorganization in hypnosis in the absence of specific 
suggestions for amnesia is also mixed. Kihlstrom and Evans (1979) reported that in the 
absence of a specific suggestion for amnesia. participants with high hypnotic ability 
recailed the events of hypnosis in the same temporal order as did less hypnotizable 
participants. However, problems with that study include the fact that the sample size was 
quite smail (N = 72) and participants were not selected for hypnotic ability. Thus, it is at 
lest  possible that there were not enough participants with high hypnotic ability in the 
sarnple to demonstrate an effect. 
in contrast. other researchers have reported that in the absence of a specific 
suggestion for amnesia participants with high hypnotic ability recall in a more temporally 
disorganized fashion than do unhypnotized control participants. Using the standard scales 
paradigm. Schwartz (1978), and Radtke, Spanos, Malva and Stam (1986). have 
demonstrated that even prior to receiving suggestions for amnesia, hypnotized participants 
are significantly less sequential in their recall of their hypnotic experiences than are 
nonhypnotized control participants. hdeed, Radtke et al. (1986) went as fu as to Say that 
the effects of hypnosis on temporal organization might not be due to suggested amnesia (p. 
50) ! 
There may be good reason for the mixed evidence for temporal disorganization in 
hypnotized participants. Fint, recent findings indicate patients with frontal lobe lesions 
do not always exhibit impairments in recency judgements. For example, it has been 
demonstrated that patients with frontal lobe damage perform as well as control participants 
when the experimentea make sure the items are encoded distinctively by having subjects 
manipulate each item (e.g. lift the cup) (McAndrews and Milner, 199 1). One could argue 
that participants might remember the events of hypnosis insofar as they are asked to 
manipulate each item (e-g. lift your arm). Given this concem, it seerns reasonable to search 
for evidence of temporal disorganization in high hypnotizables using other paradigms (e.g. 
Milner, Coni, and Leonard, 199 1; Sanders and Warrington. 197 1 : Shimamura et al.; 1990). 
Indeed, when researchers have used the Recall Organization Paradigm, they have generally 
found a reduction in organizational strategies and categorization following suggestions for 
amnesia (Kihlstrorn, 1985; Spanos, 1986; Evans, 1988). in addition, when hypnotized 
participants are able to report some of the words following the suggestion for amnesia 
("partial amnesics"), they recall in a more disorganized fashion than control participants 
who tend to recall ail of the words (Radtke-Bodorik, Planas and Spanos, 1980; Spanos and 
Bodorick, 1977; Spanos, Radtke-Bodorick and Stam, 1980). 
It is important to note that Spanos (1980) reported that hypnotized participants 
perfom as well as low hypnotizable control participants when learning categorized word 
lists pnor to any suggestion for amnesia. However, a potential problern with the work of 
Spanos (1986) in this domain is that he typically asked participants to leam categorized 
word lists that consist of three words from each of three categories. It seems possible that 
by using so few words and so few categories, Spanos (1980, 1986) did not employ a task 
that was diffîcult enough to detect any differences in categorization between participants 
with high and low hypnotic ability. 
Kihlstrorn (1980b) has reported that hypnotized participants recall both categorized 
and uncategorized word lists in the same organized fashion that unhypnotized participants 
do. For catagorized word tasks, Kihlstrom (1980b) used four categones of four words each, 
which seems more likely to lead to disorganized recaIi than the three words from t h  
categories employed by Spanos (1986). However, it is important to note an important 
qualification. Kihlstrom ( l98Ob) only reported that hypnotized and unhypnotized 
participants recall the words in the same categorical fashion on the 1 s t  recall trial. In a later 
study, Kihlstrom (1984) again reported that high hypnotizable participants perform as well 
on word categorization tasks pnor to any suggestions for amnesia. However, because he 
was only interested in partial suggested amnesia, Kihlstrom (1984) culled al1 very high 
( 1 1 - 12) hypnotizables from his sample. 
To sum up, there are several problerns with the research to date on subjective 
categorization using the Recall Organization Paradigm, including: 1) Some researchen 
(Kihlstrom. 1980) have been interested in studying partial amnesia and so they have culled 
the most responsive participants from their samples leaving them uniikely to find any 
interesting unsuggested effects; 2) Researchen have typically only been interested in 
comparing participants' recall organization on the last learning uial. It is somewhat 
underwhelming to find that al1 participants recall the words in an organized fashion when 
they have successfully learned the list; and 3) The categonzed word lists provide their own 
retrievd strategy. Even frontal lobe patients are able to leam categorized word lists as well 
as normal controls (S himamura, 1995). 
Source Amnesia 
One can often rernember factual information but forget when or where the 
information was either originally or last eacounte~d. Such experiences represent a loss of 
source memory. Research using patient populations which have demonstrated specific and 
dissociable source amnesia have long been taken as evidence that there is a distinction 
between rnemory for factuai (semantic) information on the one hand, and memory for 
contextual (episodic) information on the other (Tulving, 1972. 1983; Hirst, 1982; Mayes, 
Meudell, and Pickering, 1985). 
Source error effects are usually associated with impairment in the cognitive 
processes associated with the frontal lobes (Muscovitch, 1994; Shimamura. 1995). As 
evidence for a specific source amnesia deficit for patients with frontal lobe deficits, 
Janowsky et al. (1989b) reported on an expenment in which patients with frontal lobe 
lesions and controi participants were asked to leam to leam a set of 20 obscure trivia facts 
(e.g., The name of the dog on the Cracker Jacks box is "Bingo"). After a six to eight day 
retention interval, participants were tested for recall of both the facts learned during the 
previous session (e.g.. What is the name of the dog on the Cracker Jacks box?) and for 20 
new facts, as well for their knowledge of the source of the information. Janowsky et ai. 
were interested in two kinds of source erron: 1) enors in which participants falsely 
reponed that an "old" fact learned in the fiat session was most recently encountered at 
some time prior to the fint session; and 2) erron in which participants incorrectly reported 
that a recently "new" fact was encountered dunng the first learning session. The researchers 
reported that according to these criteria, source memory was impaired in patients with 
frontal lobe lesions, even though their memory for the "old" facts was as good as that of 
control participants. 
In the hypnosis literature. there is has been a good deal written about source 
amnesia following specific suggestions for amnesia. A number of researchers (Cooper, 
1966; Evans and Thom, 1966; Gheorgui, 1967) have employed a paradigm very much like 
that employed by Janowsky et al. ( 1989b) to dernonstrate that hypnotized participants 
demonstrate source amnesia. in these expenments, participants are generaliy asked several 
questions, the answee to which they do not usually know (e.g., An amethyst is a blue or 
purple gemstone. What colour does it tum when exposed to heat?). After participants are 
told the correct answer to the questions. posthypnotic amnesia is usually suggested in the 
standard way. After participants are tested for their memory of the content of the hypnosis 
session (standard recall amnesia). the same questions are asked again. Like frontal lobe 
patients. hypnotized participants often respond with the correct answer to the question. even 
though they are unable to speciQ how they know the answer. For example, when asked "An 
amethyst is a blue or purple gemstone, what colour does it turn when it is exposed to heat?" 
participants with hypnoticdly suggested amnesia will quickly respond "yellow" but on 
subsequent inquiry are unable to speciQ how they know the answer (Evans and Thom, 
1966; Evans, 1979). 
The above data on source amnesia following suggestions for amnesia are consistent 
with the distinction that Kihlstrom ( 1980, 1985) makes between the effects of suggestions 
for amnesia on explicit and implicit memory. For example, in one study. Kihlstrom (1980) 
gave participants suggestions for amnesia for word lisü that they had lemed while 
hypnotized and then asked hem to perform a word association task. Kihlstrom 
demonstrated that participants* amnesia for word list items (explicit memory) did oot 
prevent them from producing the target items as responses to the word association task 
(implicit memory). On the bais of these and other data, Kihlstrom (1980) conciuded that 
posthypnotic amnesia represents a temporary dissociation of the episodic features h m  
memory traces. so that amnesic participants have difficulty reconstnicting the context in 
which the target events occur. 
There is some evidence that hypnotized participants demonstrate evidence of source 
amnesia without any specific suggestions for amnesia. Thom (1960) reported on a study in 
which participants were taught, while hypnotized. the answea to three questions, 
information which they had not previously known. They were later awakened and tested to 
see if they remembered the information and its source. Thom (1960) reported that 8% of 
her sarnple could correcily report the information, but not where they had learned it. As a 
result of a similar study, Evans (1965) concluded that some spontaneous source amnesia is 
a genuine effect of hypnosis and not sirnply an artifact of the demand charactenstics of the 
situation. 
The data reported above constitutes fairly good evidence that source amnesia similar 
to that found in patients with frontal lobe damage is found in hypnotized participants. 
Moreover, it would appear that people insuucted to "fake" good hypnotic ability 
(simulators) do not display source amnesia in the way that participants with high hypnotic 
ability do. Participants asked to simulate high hypnotic ability claim amnesia for the 
information to be recaiied as well as the source, whereas participants with high hypnotic 
ability recall the information but not the source (Evans, 1979; 1988). 
Metamemow and Cornitive Estimation 
When people are asked to remember, they can be either more or less sure that the 
information is available andor accunite. At one extreme. people wiii sometimes report that 
the information is "on the tip of the tongue" even though they cannot access it. Indeed, 
people with anomic deficits report this experience quite often (Shimarnura. 1995). At the 
other extreme people. for example. patients with Korsakof s Syndrome (Lezak. 1983). cm 
report confabulations which they are quite certain are memones. Confabulating patients can 
be said to be wildly inaccurate in their knowledge of their own rnemory capabilities. Such 
would also be the case for people who mistakenly believed that some information was "on 
the tip of the tongue," if in fact they could not possibly know the information. People who 
confabulate or who expenence an inaccurate "tip of the tongue" phenomenon could be said 
to be suffenng from a deficit in metamemory, that is, a deficit in knowledge of what they 
know a d o r  a deficit in the ability to initiate and monitor strategies that can be used to 
access memories (Metcaife and Shimamura, 1994). Indeed, S hallice ( 1988) has coined the 
term "frontal arnnesia" to descnbe a syndrome in patients who are unable to discriminate 
memories from associations, who are over-confident in their incorrect memories and who 
are likely to confabulate. perhaps especially when prompted by leading questions. 
Janowsky. Shimamura and Squire (1989a) have reported that patients with frontal 
lobe lesions exhibit metamemory deficits when they are asked to make judgements about 
what they know. For example, in one test, participants were given 24 sentences to leam 
(e.g., Patty's garden was full of Marigolds). After a delay, cued recall was assessed for the 
last word in each sentence (e.g., Patty's garden was full of J. If participants 
could not recall the correct answer, they were asked to rate on a four point scale how likely 
they would be to recognize the answer from a number of alternatives. The 'Yeeling of 
knowing" (FOIS) judgements were then correlated with performance on a subsequent 
recognition task using a multiplechoice format test. Janowsky et al. (1989a) nponed that 
frontal lobe patients were significantly more impaired in FOK accuracy as compared to 
controls, even though the frontal lobe patients performed as well as the controls on the 
recognition task. 
Shimamura (1995) has speculated that the inaccuracy of the feeling of knowing 
judgements of frontal lobe patients might be related to the deficits this population exhibits 
on other retrieval tasks. For exarnple, it has been demonstrated that frontal lobe patients 
sometimes have difficulty making estimates or inferences that draw on knowledge gained 
from everyday expenence. Shallice and Evans (1978) reponed that participants with frontal 
lobe lesions often give wildly inaccurate responses to questions such as "How taIl is the 
average English woman?" Similarly. Smith and Milner ( 1984) have demonstrated that 
participants with frontal lobe lesions can have difficulty estimating the pnce of objects. 
According to Shimamura (1995). the answen to questions that require participants to make 
cognitive estimations or estimate the pnce of various objects are not readily available and 
require the participants to engage in some active search and retrievd strategies. If 
rnetamemory is defined as a dificulty in "knowing what you know" or in employing 
appropriate search strategies, then difficulties with cognitive estimation and feeling of 
knowing judgements provide further evidence of impahed metamemory in frontal 
lobe patients. According to Shimamura ( l995), the evidence for impairrd rnetamemory in 
frontal lobe patients lends support to the view that the role of the frontal lobe on memory 
tasks is the manipulation and organization of information rather than the storage of new 
information in memory. 
The FOK research of Janowsky et al. (1989a) bears a striking resemblance to some 
research on suggested amnesia which has been reponed by Kihlstrom (1980b). Recall that 
patients with frontal lobe damage in the Janowsky et al. (1989a) study recalled words just 
as well as controls when a context sentence was provided, even though their "feeling of 
knowing" for the words they could not recall was quite inaccurate. Kihlstrom (1980b) has 
dernonstrated that hypnotized amnesic participants can sirnilarly recall target words if they 
are given an appropriate cue word. In addition, Kihlstrom (1980b) reported an experiment 
in which participants leamed a categonzed word list and were then given a suggestion to be 
amnesic for al1 of the words. Participants with high hypnotic ability dernonstrated fairly 
dense amnesia. until given a category-instances test (ClT). On the CE, the participants 
were asked to generate 15 instances of each of several categories. Half of the categories 
were categories from the previous learning task (cntical) and half were new categones 
(neutral). Kihlstrom ( I98Ob) demonstrated that despite their arnnesia for the tiirget words. 
amnesic participants were able to recall the words in the context of the CE. 
In a sirnilar study (Kihistrorn, 1984b). participants were asked to rate their 
confidence that each of the items (old and new) had appeared on their lists. Waking control 
participants made a perfect discrimination between old and new items. In contrast, 
hypnotized participants found it more difficult to distinguish between old and new material, 
being less confident that old material had been learned previously and more confident that 
they had previously encountered the new material (Kihlstrom, 1985). These results seem 
consistent with a "frontal" account of suggested amnesia that posits a deficit in 
metamemory as a fundamental underlying diKiculty. 
There is additional evidence that suggests a deficit in metamemory for hypnotized 
participants. For exarnple. Dywan and Bowen ( 1983) have demonstrated that using 
hypnosis to "refresh" mernory for previously levned materiai leads to three fairly reliable 
effects with high hypnotizable participants: I )  participants report more "recovered" 
mernories during hypnosis than at baseline; 2) hypnotized participants report being highly 
confident in these "recovered" memones and; 3) hypnotized participants "recovered 
memories corne at a very high cost because they are "accompanied by at least three times as 
many errors as were made by participants in any other condition" (Dywan and Bowers, 
1983, p. 185). 
Using a paradigm that exposed participants to misleading information dunng 
hypnosis, Sheehan (1988) has demonstraied that the accuracy of memory reports in 
hypnosis is often greatly reduced and that hypnotized participants often confabulate source 
information. These and other data (Orne. Soskis, Dinges and Orne, 1984; Smith. 1983) 
have led to the view that hypnosis produces a more lax report criterion, i.e. any increase in 
recail that emerges following an hypnotic induction reflects a greater willingness to report 
as memories items that normally do not reach the critical threshold of evaluation that is 
used by participants for making  ports of memory (Dywan, 1995; Sheehan, 1988). An 
alternative view is that for participants with high hypnotic abiiity, hypnosis alters the 
experience of retneval such that memones "retrieved" during hypnosis are more likely to 
have the qualities (e.g. perceptual fluency, vividness) usually associated with remembering. 
The resulting "iiiusion of familiarity," rather than a more lax report criterion. could 
account for the higher levels of confidence that are so fkquentiy observed in hypnotic 
recall (Dywan, 1995). 
Whatever the specific mechanism. consistent with a "frontal amnesia" (Shallice, 
1988; Shimarnura, 1995) account of the effects of hypnosis on memory, Evans (1988) has 
concluded that "Posthypnotic amnesia seems to involve a blurring of the context. resulting 
in cognitions that are for a time only tenuously linked with waking experience and memory. 
Phenomenologicaily, the hypnotized subject knows, but does not know how, why, or even 
what he or she knows" (Evans, 1988, p. 187). 
There are no repons in the hypnosis literature of hypnotized participants 
demonstrating dificulties in cognitive estimation sirnilar to those dernonstrated by Shallice 
and Evans (1978) or Smith and Milner (1984) with frontal lobe patients. However, there 
have been nurnerous reports that hypnotized participants demonstrate deficits in cognitive 
estimation of other sorts. For example, it has been reported that hypnotized participants 
tend to radically underestimate the amount of time that they have been hypnotized 
(Schwartz, 1978). However, given the abundant evidence of hypnotized participants* 
difficulties with cognitive estimation of the introspective (metacognitive) son (Bowen, 
Woody and Oakman, 1992), it seems potentially worthwhile to include the Shallice and 
Evans (1978) Cognitive Estimation task in a study of the unsuggested effects of hypnosis 
on memory. 
Summing up so far, there would appear to be a nice fit between the evidence from 
hypnosis literature and the frontal memory literature described by Shimamura (1995). In 
addition, Shimarnura's (1995) theoreticai interpretation of the fmdings with respect to the 
role of frontal lobe function in memory tasks seems strikingly similar to the explanation for 
behaviour of hypnotized participants offered by Woody and Bowen (1994). He argues that 
the deficit that underlies al1 of the subtle effects of frontal lobe damage on memory is the 
inability of frontal lobe patients to inhibit or disregard irrelevant information. According to 
Shimamura ( 1995) the critical relevant function of the prefrontal cortex is to provide a 
filtering or gating mechanism that provides inhibitory control of the postenor cortical 
regions which are responsible for more specific aspects of cognitive functioning. In this 
view, impairment in memory for temporal order (e.g. recency judgernents. source memory) 
is the indirect result of an impairment in inhibitory gating: 
For example, remembering where and when a fact was leamed rnay require 
extensive retrieval strategies that require several search paths, some of 
which may not be productive. Inability to inhibit irrelevant search strategies 
rnay interfere on tasks that require extensive search and retrieval. This 
explanation accounts not only for disordea of spatial temporal context. but 
may also ex plain related cognitive disorden associated with frontal lobe 
lesions, such as disorden of problem solving, inference making, 
metamernos, and cognitive estimation. (Shimamura. 1995, p. 81 1) 
As mentioned previously, Shallice (1988) has proposed his own account of the 
mechanisms underlying "frontal amnesia," which is quite sirnilar to the account offered by 
Shimarnura ( 1995). According to Shallice (1988): 
Frontal amnesia, then, appears to be an impairment of that part of the 
Supentisory System concemed with formulating the description of any 
mernories that might be required and of verifying that any candidate 
memories that have been revieved are relevant. Classical amnesia. by 
conuast, would aise frorn an interruption of the fiow of mernory 
information from the processing system to the S upervisory systern. (S hailice, 
1988, p. 378) 
The above interpretation of the accumulated literature on the unsuggested effects of 
hypnosis on memoiy is that hypnotized participants show many of the subtle impairments 
in memory performance that have been observed in patients with frontal lobe damage. The 
purpose of Study Four is to directly compare the performance of hypnotized participants to 
the performance of control participants on the tasks suggested by S himamura ( 1995) as 
being sensitive to diminished frontal functioning. According to the dissociated control 
mode1 (Woody and Bowea. 1994). hypnotized participants should show impairment on 
frontal memory tasks similar to patients with frontal lobe damage. In contrast, according to 
the dissociative experience account (KiNstrom. 1992), hypnotized participants should show 
no impairment on the frontal memory tasks relative to control participants in the absence of 
any specific suggestion for amnesia. Thus, in Study Four participants with high and low 
hypnotic ability were compared on performance on memory tasks suggested by Shimarnura 
(1995) as king sensitive to fiontal lobe functioning both within and outside of the context 
of hypnosis. The tasks suggested by Shimarnura (1995) were employed, except for the 
substitution of the similar Pattern Meanings Task of Wdach and Kogan (1965) for the 
Design Fiuency Task. The Design Fluency task described by Shimarnura (1995) and 
advocated by Jones-Gotman and Milner (1977) as a test of nght frontal lobe damage was 
not employed in this study for two reasons. First, Gruzeîier and Wamn (1993) have already 
demonstnted that hypnotized participants demonstrate an impairment in Design Fluency 
that is similar to the impairment observed in patients with frontal lobe darnage. Second, it is 
not clear that the Design Fluency task is as good a measure of right frontal lobe functioning 
(Jones-Gotrnan and Milner, 1977) as Word Fluency is a measure of Ieft frontal lobe 
functioning (Benton and Hamsher, 1978). In order to check to see if results consistent with 
the Gruzelier and Warren (1993) findings might be observed in a similar but different task, 
the Pattem Meanings Task of Wallach and Kogan (1965) was employed. The Pattern 
Meanings task of Wallach and Kogan (1965) has been used in the past as an aid in the 
assessrnent of creativity in children (Wallach and Kogan, 1965) and undergraduate 
populations (Cropley, Woody & Claridge, 1976). In the Pattern Meanings Task, the 
participant is asked to provide a number of possible meanings or interpretations of a 
number of abstract visual designs. It was not particularly troubling for the present purpose 
that the task has a significant verbal component. What was more important is that the task 
allows one to look for the kinds of errors, panicularly poverty of response and 
perseverations, that have been associated with frontal lobe darnage (Lezak. 1988). 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty participants with high hypnotic ability and thirty participants with low 
hypnotic ability were selected according to the sarne citeria as in Study Two. An attempt 
was made to assign roughly equal numbers of males and females to each condition. As in 
the previous studies. participants were pre-tested for hypnotic ability and selected for 
participation in the study by a research assistant to ensure that the expenmenter was blind 
to participants' hypnotic ability. 
Procedure 
Participants were telephoned and either asked to participate in a study of hypnosis 
and memory (hypnosis condition) or a study of memory and individual differences 
(non-hypnotic context condition). Across two sessions. participants completed the battery 
in one of four possible counterbalanced orders. However, al1 participants began and ended 
the fint session with the source amnesia iask and began and ended the second session with 
the metamemory task. In addition, the order of tasks was arranged such that participants 
were not asked to perforrn two memonzation tasks in a row. 
At the outset of the fmt experimental session, participants were informed about the 
general nature of the experiment. Participants in the nonhypnotic condition were not 
informed about the relevance of their hypnotic ability until the end of the second session. 
After obtaining informed consent, participants in the hypnosis condition received the sarne 
standard hypnotic induction used in Studies Two and Three, while participants in the 
nonhypnotic condition were simply introduced to the source amnesia iask as the fmt test. In 
the second session, participants completcd the second half of the test battery, with 
participants in the hypnosis condition again fmt receiving the standard hypnotic induction. 
Free Recall 
Stimuli 
The 15-word list was made up from the third or fourth most frequently given 
instances of the fint 15 categones of Battig and Montague ( 1969) with the exception that 
no two words could begin with the same letter and no two words could rhyme. The stimuli 
were as follows: Ruby, Year, Mother, Inch, Steel, Novel, Pnvate, Horse, Cotton, Yellow, 
Fork, Temple, Verb, Desk, and Eye. 
Administration 
The task was essentially the Rey Auditory Verbal Learning Test (Lezak, 1983; 
Rey, 1964). Participants were aurally presented the list of 15 unrelated words and asked to 
recall as many words as possible following the presentation. Five successive study-test 
trials were presented, with the same 15 words presented in a different order for each study 
inal. The list of words was read to each participant at the rate of one word per second, 
followed by an oral test of free recall that continued for thirty seconds. Participants' 
responses were recorded on audiotape. The measure of interest was the number of words 
recalled on the fifth learning bal. 
Proactive Interference (AC 1 1 
Stimuli 
The stimuli consisted of the two lists of 12 paired associates (e.g. RIVER-POND, 
LION-HUNTER) ernployed by Shimamura. Janowsky, and Squire ( 1995). Across the two 
lists. the cue words were the same (Le. the f ia t  word in each pair), whereas the response 
words (i.e. the second word in each pair) were different (Bjork, 1992; Postman and 
Undenvood. 196 1). The stimuli were printed on 4 X 6 inch index cards using Helvetica 
24-point type font (see Appendix H). 
Administration 
The task was administered as in Shirnamura, Janowsky, and Squire (1995). Three 
study-test trials of each paired-associate (AB) list were administered. Participants were 
shown the word pairs one at a time and insuucted to read the word pain out loud and to try 
to rernernber them as pairs so that they could later repan the second word when presented 
with the first. A sarnple word pair was given for practice. Each word pair was presented for 
3 sec. After each study trial. participants were shown index cards on which only the cue 
words were presented and asked to report the word associated with each cue word. 
Participants were encouraged to guess if a response was not given. After the first study-test 
triai. two funher study-test trials were administered in the same manner as the fint. Study 
words and test cards were presented in a different random order for each trial. with the 
exception that the last word pair presented for study was never tested during the fmt  two 
test trials in order to mduce short-term memory effects. 
Foliowing the three study-test triais for the fmt pairs of words, a second set of three 
study - test trials (AC) was administered. Participants were explicitly informed that the 
second list involved the same cue words but different test words. Otherwise, the 
instructions and procedues for the second list were the same. Across participants the 
presentation order of the word-pair associates (RIVER-POND vs. RIVER-BROOK) was 
counterbalanced. Finally. in order to determine if interference effects were due to problems 
in list discrimination, participants were given a final cued-recall test in which each cue 
word was presented and both of the response words were requested. This finai cued - recall 
test has been used in previous studies of paired-associate leming and has been called a 
"modified-modified free recall" (MMFR) test (Bames and Underwood. 1959). Participants' 
responses were audiotaped throughout this task. The measure of interest was the number of 
errors on the first test trial for the second (AC) list. 
Word FIuency 
Stimuli and Administration 
Participants were given 60 seconds per category to Say as many words as possible 
begiming with the letters F, A and S. These letters were selected from Borkowski et al.3 
( 1967) word fluency hierarchy as being suitably difficult for an undergraduate population. 
Participants were instructed not to use proper names or repetitions of the same word with 
different endings. Participants' responses were audiotaped. Participants' performance was 
measured using three indices: 1) total number of words produced for the three letters; 2) 
number of errors. i.e. the number of times the panicipant failed to follow instructions; and 
3) number of peneverative responses. 
Pattern Meanings Task 
In the Pattern Meanings Task, the participant is asked to provide a number of 
possible meanings or interpretations of a number of abstract visuai designs. 
Stimuli 
A reduced version of the Wallach and Kogan (1965) task consisting of t h  
abstract designs pnnted on 4 X 6 inch index cards was employed. 
Administration 
Participants were asked to respond to the three stimuli following instructions adapted 
from Woody (1 976). Participants were presented with the stimuli one at a time in a random 
order and asked to tell the experimenter "al1 the things" that the design rnight be. It was 
emphasized that the drawing was to be considered as a complete entity. The experimenter 
was also careful to demonstrate that the card could be turned to provide different 
perspectives. Participants' responses were audiotaped. 
The Pattern Meanings Task yields two primary scores of interest, total number of 
responses and unique responses (Wallach and Kogan, 1965). Total number of responses is 
simply the number of responses the participant makes to each card surnmed across cards to 
yield a total score. A "unique response" is recorded for an item if a participant provides a 
response which does not occur again across the entire sample. A third measure of interest 
was the number of perseverations, including trivial variations on the same theme (Woody, 
1976). 
Word Seauencing Task 
Stimuli 
Fifteen common one or two syllable words were selectcd according to the same 
criteria as for the free recall task and pnnted individually on 4 X 6 inch index cards. The 
stimuli were as follows: Opal, Hour, Father, Yard, Gold Paper, Sergeant, Chapel, Wool, 
Blue, Knife, Tiger, Noun, Larnp, and Foot. 
Administration 
Words were presented visually at the rate of 3 sec per word. and participants were 
instructed to read each word aloud and to try to remember the order in which the words 
appex. Each participant was presented with a different random order of words. 
Immediately following the study phase, the experimenter arranged the words on a tabie in 
front of the participant in a random array. Participants were instructed to place the words in 
the sarne sequence in which they had just been presented -- from the first word presented to 
the iast. Participants were given as much time as they required to reconstruct the list. The 
rneasure of interest was the Spearman rank correlation between the actual study order and 
the order in which the participant placed the cards during the organization task (perfect 
score = + 1 .O). 
Source Amnesia 
Stimuli 
Thirry difficult general information questions were selected from Nelson and Narens 
(1980) n o m  and from reference books by lanowsky et al. (1989b) and were designed to 
tap participants' knowledge about obscure facts across a variery of topics including 
literature, movies and music. geography, sports, and history (e.g. What is the name of the 
town through which Lady Godiva supposedly made her famous ride?). The thirty questions 
were divided into two sets of 15 questions each. Each set contained three facts from each of 
the five categories (see Appendix 1). For each participant, one set of 15 facts was presented 
in the study phase and the other was used in the test phase as foils. The two sets were 
counterbaianced across the study and test conditions. Ten easy factual questions were also 
included in the test phase (e.g. What is the name of a dried gnpe?) to ensure that some 
correctly answered questions had clearly been learned from a source outside the 
experimental situation (Janowsky et al. ( 1989b). 
Administration 
At the beginning of the study phase, participants were presented with the questions in 
the form of "facts" (e-g. The name of the town through which Lady Godiva supposedly 
made her famous ride is Coventry). Participants were informed that the task was sirnply a 
test of how people categorize information. No instructions were given to try to learn and 
remember the material. Participants were asked to read each fact aloud from a pnnted card 
and place each card in one of five categories (literature, movies and music. geography, 
sports. and history). Cards showing each category name were arranged in front of the 
participant. The task was self-paced. After the 15 cards were soned. the cards were 
shuffled. the category names are rearranged on the table and the participant was asked to 
repeat the categorization task. 
At the end of the experimental session. Le. after the participant had completed a 
number of intervening tasks. both source recall and recognition memory were tested. The 
facts were now presented in the form of aura1 questions (e.g.. What was the narne of the 
town through which Lady Godiva made her farnous ride?). The participant was tested on 40 
facts. the 15 facts that had previously been presented. 15 new dificult (baseline) questions 
that had not been previously presented and ten new easy face. No reference to the study 
phase was made. Rather, participants were simply asked to answer some general 
information questions. The 15 previously presented facts, 15 new fats and 10 easy new 
facts were presented in a different randorn order for each participant (Janowsky et al.. 
l989b). 
When participants correctly answered a question. they were asked to recollect when 
they had last encountered that information (Can you tell me the 1 s t  time you encountered 
that information?). When participants incorrectiy answered a question, they were asked if 
they had ever encountered the information before. If a participant answered in the 
affirmative, then she or he was asked when the fast time was that the information had been 
encountered. Thus, even if a participant failed to recall the information leamed earlier in the 
session, she or he might identiv that time as the most recent tirne that the information was 
encountered. Participants' responses were audiotaped throughout this task. 
Two types of error were recorded. An "omission" was recorded if the participant 
reported that the information was leamed from an outside source. when it had in fact been 
presented during the study phase. A "commission" was recorded if the participant reponed 




Shdlice and Evans (1978) consuucted a list of 15 questions for which the correct 
approach (or strategy) for answenng the question is not irnmediately apparent (e.g. How ta11 
is the average Canadian woman?). However, once an appropriate suategy is hit upon, 
participants do not require any kind of specialist knowledge to provide a reasonable answer. 
A 14-item version of the task slightly adapted for University of Waterloo participants was 
employed (Appendix J). 
Administration 
The questions were presented aurally and participants were given 30 seconds to 
answer each question. If requested. the question was repeated. Participants were encouraged 
to give an answer if they initially said that they have no idea. or if they had not provided an 
answer after 30 seconds. Participants' responses were audiotaped. 
The measure of interest was the extremeness of a response (Shallice and Evans. 
1978), which could be either greater than or less than the average answer. Considering 
responses greater or less than average. any answer given that was greater or less than the 
average response for that question by two standard deviations or more was considered to be 
extreme. The number of extreme responses was summed for each participant in order to 
allow for a cornparison across groups. 
Metmemorv 
Stimuli 
Twenty-four simple sentences were printed individually on index cards (e.g.. At the 
museum we saw some ancient relics made of clay.) (Shimamura and Squk. 1986) 
( Appendix K) . 
Administration 
The procedure was a slightly modified version of the task descnbed in Shimamura 
and Squire (1986). At the outset of the experimentd session, participants were presented 
with 24 sentences for study. Participants were asked to read each sentence aloud and to 
study the sentences so that they could remember them later. Sentences were each presented 
for 10 seconds. Twelve of the 24 sentences were presented once during the study phase and 
12 of the sentences were presented twice during the study phase. for a total of 36 sentence 
presentations per participant. Sentences were presented in a random order across 
participants. At the end of the experimentai session, after several intervening tasks, 
participants were asked to recall or guess a missing word in each of 36 sentences (24 
sentences from the study phase and 12 new sentences that have not been previously 
studied). Participants were encouraged to guess if they were uncertain. Also, they were 
correctly informed that they may not have previously seen some of the test items 
(Janowsky, Shimamura and Squire, 1989a). 
Immediately following the recall phase, participants were asked to make 
feeling-of-knowing (FOK) judgements for al1 non-recalled deleted words (including both 
errors of omission and commission). For each non-recailed item, as well as for each of the 8 
new items. participants rated their FOK on a Cpoint scale (high, medium, low, pure guess). 
More specificdly, participants were shown each sentence and asked to judge how likely 
they would be able to recognize the missing word if some choices were given. Afier placing 
the non-recailed sentences and 12 new sentences into one of the four FOK categories, 
participants were asked to rank order the sentences within each rating category according to 
their FOK. Thus, at the end of this phase, al1 of the sentences were ranked, from the one 
judged as having the highest feeling-of-knowing to the one judged as having the lowest 
feeling-of-knowing (Janowsky, Shimarnura and Squire, 1989a). 
Foiiowing the FOK phase, participants were given a seven-alternative, forced-choice 
recognition test for al1 24 study sentences and the 12 new sentences. Eight alternatives were 
available for each question (see Appendix L). If the participant gave one of the alternatives 
as an incorrect response dunng the initial recail phase, that alternative was omitted from the 
recall test. Othenvise, one of the incorrect alternatives was rmdomly omitted. Thus. there 
were always seven possible choices for the blank in each sentence. The measure of interest 
for determining the accuracy of the FOK judgements was the within-subject correlation 
between the FOK ranking and recognition performance for the sentences that had been 
presented at the beginning of the session (Janowsky, Shimamura and Squire (1989a). 
Results 
The central results of a senes of 2 Hypnotic Ability (high, low) X 2 Context 
(induction, no induction) ANOVAs of the data from the frontal memory tasks are presented 
in Table 10. For each task ou tliers were removed at 2 m s  from the mean. Somewhat 
suprisingly, most of the effects observed were main effects for hypnotic ability. although 
there were some trends towards interactions between hypnotic ability and context. On most 
tasks, participants with high hypnotic ability performed less well than participants with low 
hypnotic ability both within and outside of the context of hypnosis, except for one task in 
which participants w ith high hypnotic ability performed better than those with low hypnotic 
ability. 
Considering fint the Free Recall task, which rrquired participants to leam a list of 
15 unrelated words, participants with high hypnotic abiiity recalled significantly fewer 
words (M = 13.18, = 1.04) on the fifth leming trial as compared to participants with 
low hypnotic ability (M = 13.79, = 0.94) both within and outside of the context of 
hypnosis. There was a good deal of variability in the degree to which participants repeated 
the same word. Across ail leaming trials. participants with high hypnotic ability made more 
peneverative responses (M = 5.96, = 4.60) as compared to participants with low 
hypnotic ability (M = 3.14, = 3.17) both within and outside of the context of hypnosis. 
However, a 2 Hypnotic Ability (high, low) X 2 Context (induction, no induction) ANOVA 
of the number of errors (Le. words reported that were not on the list) committed across 
triais revealed no significani main effects or interactions. 
Table 10 
Results of  a series of 2 Hmnotic Abilitv (high. low) X 2 Context (induction. no induction] 
ANOVAs of Results from the Frontal Memorv Tasks (continued next mgel 
Hypnotic Ability - F 
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Note . HA = hypnotic ability; C = Context * ~ < . 0 5 ,  * *gc.Ol  
MMFR = modified-modified free recd ACI = proactive interference aial 
Results of a series of 2 Hwnotic Abilitv (high, low) X 2 Context (induction, no induction) 
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Word Sequencing Correlation 
Source Omission Errors 
M -
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Total Source Errors 
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Note . HA = hypnotic ability; C = Context *e<.05, **ec.Ol 
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Considering next the proactive interference task. a series of Hypnotic Ability (high. 
low) X Context (induction, no induction) ANOVAs of the number of erron made on the 
fint study-test trial of the first set of pain of words (AB 1) and the final cued recall task in 
which participants were asked to report both responses to the stem word (MMFR) revealed 
no significant main effects or interactions. AU participants perfonned equally well when 
learning on the first study-test trial (AB 1). However, the main effect for hypnotic ability 
approached significance for the MMFR trial, F (1,55) = 1.13, Q = 0.1 1. Participants with 
high hypnotic ability tended to make more mistakes (M = 0.72, = 0.70) on the MMFR 
trial as compared to participants with low hypnotic ability (M = 0.41, = 0.69). 
Participants with high hypnotic made more erron on the AC1 trial both within and outside 
of the context of hypnosis as compared to participants with loe hypnotic ability (M = 2.35, 
SD=  1.42 vs. M =  1.17,SD=0.94). - 
An Hypnotic Ability (high, low) X Context (induction, no induction) ANOVA of 
the total number of Word Fluency responses across the three trials (F,A,S) yielded no 
significant main effects or interactions. A Hypnotic Ability (high, low) X Context 
(induction, no induction) ANOVA of total number of perseverations yielded no significant 
main effects or interactions. However, the interaction between hypnotic ability and context 
approached significance, F (1,55) = 3.23, g = 0.08. The interaction appeared to be the result 
of participants with high hypnotic ability in the hypnosis condition producing more 
peaeverations (M = 0.60. = 0.74) as cornpared to participants with high hypnotic ability 
outside of the context of hypnosis (M = 0.23, = 0.44), 1 (26) = 1.58, g = .127. 
An Hypnotic Ability (hi& low) X Context (induction. no induction) ANOVA of 
total number of responses. uniqueness and perseventions on the Pattern Meanings Task 
yielded no significant main effects or interactions. In contrast. an Hypnotic Ability (high. 
low) X Context (induction. no induction) ANOVA of the Spearman rank correlation 
between the actual study order and the order in which the participant placed the stimulus 
cards dunng the Word Sequencing task yielded a significant main effect for hypnotic 
ability. Somewhat suprisingly, participants with high hypnotic ability performed better (M 
= 0.8 1. = 0.13) on this task than did participants with low hypnotic ability (M = 0.68, 
SD = O. 18). -
Considering next the source amnesia task (e.g. What is the name of the town 
through which Lady Godiva supposedly made her famous ride?). participants with high 
hypnotic ability tended to make more errors of omission on the source amnesia task (M = 
2.33, = 1.73) as compared to participants with low hypnotic ability (M = 1.46, = 
1.32). An Hypnotic Ability (high, low) X Context (induction, no induction) ANOVA of the 
number of commission erroa also yielded no significant main effects or interactions. 
However, a sirnilar analysis of the total number of source errors (omission plus commission 
errors) yielded a significant main effect for hypnotic ability and no other significant main 
effect or interactions. Overall, participants with high hypnotic ability tended to make more 
source errors = 2.78, = 2.25), as compared to participants with low hypnotic ability 
(M = 1.50, = 1.55). It is important to note that an Hypnotic Ability (high, low) X 
Context (induction. no induction) ANOVA of the number of simple retrieval failures, Le., 
the number of the fifteen trivia facts categorized at the outset of the session that they failed 
to recaii at the end of the session. reweaied no signiricant main effects or interactions. Thus, 
although participants with high hypnotic ability had the most source errors. they were on 
average equdly able to retneve the information from the outset of the session. 
The measure of interest for the cognitive estimation task (e.g. How ta11 is the 
average Canadian woman?) was the extrerneness of a response (Shallice and Evans. 1978). 
which could be either greater than or less than the correct (average) answer. Any mswer 
given that was greater or less than the average response for that question by two standard 
deviations was considered an extreme response. The number of extreme responses was 
sumrned for each participant in order to allow for a cornparison across groups. An Hypnotic 
Ability (high. low) X Context (induction. no induction) ANOVA of number of extreme 
responses failed to yield any significant main effects or interactions. 
Findly, turning to the metarnemory task, an Hypnotic Ability (high. low) X Context 
(induction, no induction) ANOVA revealed no significant main effects or interactions for 
the number of words recalled dunng the recall phase. Overall, participants were quite good 
at recailing the words from the study phase when presented with the context sentence. 
failing to recdl an average of only 3.50 (- = 1.48) out of the 24 from the study phase. 
Participants, on average. were also quite good at the recognition task, failing to recognize 
ody 1 .O5 (SD = 1.15) of the words from the study phase when presented with the 
forced-choice recognition task An Hypnotic Ability (high, low) X Context (induction, no 
induction) ANOVA revealed no significant main effects or interactions for the number of 
recognition failures. 
It had initidy b a n  planned to determine the accuracy of the feeling-of-knowing 
(FOK) judgements by calculating the comlation between the FOK ranking and recognition 
performance (Hays, 1973; Nelson, 1984). However, given how well participants perfomed 
on the recall phase of the task, with most participants recalling most of the words. it seemed 
more reasonable to simpiy determine whether or not participants with high hypnotic ability 
were more likely to make gross FOK errors. Thus, participants were considered to have 
committed an error of omission. if they rated the confidence of their ability to recognize a 
word as "low" or a "pure guess" when they had. in fact. been presented with the sentence in 
the study phase. Participants were considered to have committed an error of commission, if 
they rated their confidence of their ability to recognize a word as "high" or "medium," 
when they had, in fact, not been presented with the sentence in the study phase. In short, 
participants could either be under-confident about their ability to recognize the missing 
word that had previously been presented in the sentence during the study phase (omission) 
or over-confident about their ability 
to recognize the missing word from a sentence that had not previously been presented 
(commission). Participants made, on average, 1.89 omission erron (SD = 1 S8) and 0.25 
ISD = 0.55) commission errors in their FOK judgements. Because the average of the total 
number of erroa of either type was quite low, enors of both type were surnmed for each 
participant to yield a total metamemory error score for each participant. The results of an 
Hypnotic Ability (high, low) X Context (induction. no induction) ANOVA of total 
metamemory enon  revealed a significant main effect for hypnotic ability and no other 
significant main effects or interactions. Overall, participants with high hypnotic ability 
tended to make more metamemory errors = 3.48. = 2.53) as compared to 
participants with low hypnotic abiiity a = 2.28, = 1.86). 
Multivariate Analvsis of Variance 
The most comrnon result of the ANOVA analyses of the frontal memory tasks was a 
main effect for hypnotic ability. Participants with high hypnotic ability appeared to have 
more difficulty with rnany of these tasks both within and outside of the context of hypnosis. 
As the expected result was an interaction between hypnotic ability and context. a 
MANOVA (2 levels of hypnotic ability X 2 contexts X 6 frontal memory tasks) (Appendix 
M) was performed on the data set trimmed at 2 - in order to examine for the possibility 
of an interaction between hypnotic ability and context that relied on a broader sampling of 
task performance. The measures selected for inclusion in the anaiysis included the mesures 
likeiy to be most sensitive to differences between participants, according to the results from 
the ANOVAs reported above. The number of peneverations across free recall trials was 
included on the basis of the ANOVA results presented above which seemed to indicate that 
there were significant differences between participants with high and low hypnotic ability 
on this measure. Total source arnnesia erron appeared to be a somewhat more sensitive 
measure than omission errors and so only total source errors were considered. Thus, 
number of erroa on the proactive interference task (AC 1). number of words recalled on the 
fifth fiee recall trial, number of free recall perseverations. word sequencing score, total 
number of source errors, and total number of metamemory ema were entered into the 
analysis. The results reveded a significant main effect for hypnotic ability F (6,37) = 7.09, 
p < .001. However. despite the aggregation of measures, the hypnotic ability by context 
interaction was not found to approach significance, Pillais F (6,37) = 0.87, Q = .523. 
intercorrelations Between Frontal Memory Measures 
A table of intercorrelations of the frontal memory measures for the entire data set is 
presented in Table 1 1. As for the MANOVA, the measures selected for inclusion in the 
analysis included the measures likely to be most sensitive to differences between 
participants, according to the results frorn the ANOV As reponed above. The tasks appeared 
to be reasonably highly intercorrelated, although performance on the AWAC interference 
task (AC 1) seemed to be especially well correlated with most of the other measures. A 
sirnilar analysis perfonned on the data set trimmed at 2 ms for each measure produced 
simiiar results. 
Table 11 
Table of intercorrehtions for the Frontal Memorv Tasks IN= 60) 












Discriminant Function Analvsis 
Participants with high hypnotic ability appeared to perfonn somewhat poorly as 
compared to participants with low hypnotic ability on a nurnber of the frontal memory 
tasks. It therefore became interesting to determine the degree to which performance on such 
tasks might be used to discriminate beiween participants with high and low hypnotic 
ability. The classification results of a stepwise discriminant analysis of the entire data set is 
presented in Table 12. Once again, the measures selected for inclusion in the analysis 
included the measures likely to be most sensitive to differences between participants, 
according to the results from the ANOVAs reported above. However, data frorn the Word 
Sequencing task were not entered into the anaiysis because the results obtained from that 
measure were so contrary to what was predicted. Moreover, as mentioned previously, it is 
not clear that the Word Sequencing task is a frontal memory task. Thus, the measures 
entered into the discriminant function analysis included, number of AC 1 errors, number of 
words recailed on the fifth free recail trial, nurnber of peneverations on the free recall tiisk, 
total source amnesia errors, and total metarnemory errors. A subset of two predictors, 
number of ACI errors and number of target words recalled on the fifth free recall triai were 
quite useful in correctly classifying 71.6 % of al1 participants (Appendix N). A similar 
analysis of the data set trimmed at 2 S.D. on each measure produced similar results. 
Table 12 
Classification Results of Ste~wise Discriminant Andvsis Used to Predict Hnnotic Abilitv 
from Performance on Frontal Memow Tasks (N=60) 
Predicted Group Membership 





Percent of "grouped" cases conectly classified: 7 1.67% 
Discussion 
At the outset of this investigation it was predicted that the results would be 
consistent with the dissociated control mode1 of hypnosis. More specifically, it was 
predicted that in the absence of any specific suggestions for amnesia. hypnotized 
participants would demonstrate impaired performance on the frontal memory tasks as 
compared to participants with high hypnotic ability outside of the context of hypnosis and 
participants with low hypnotic ability in either context. It is therefore somewhat suprising 
that most of the effects obsenied wen main effects for hypnotic ability. Participants with 
high hypnotic ability appeared to have more difficulty with many of the tasks. both within 
and outside of the context of hypnosis. as compared to participants with low hypnotic 
ability. Most strikingly. participants with high hypnotic ability performed relatively poorly 
on the Free Recall, AB-AC Interference, and Source Amnesia tasks. 
These results are both broadly consistent with what one would expect from a 
dissociated control perspective, and somewhat inconsistent with it. It would appear that 
participants with high hypnotic ability have dificulty with rnany of the same kinds of tasks 
that frontal lobe patients are reported to have difficulty with, indicating relatively weak 
executive control of memory. Such a finding dovetails quite nicely with the dissociated 
control model of hypnotic responding first proposed by Bowen (1990, 1992). 
However. the performance of the panicipants with high hypnotic ability who 
participated in the experiment outside of the context of hypnosis is somewhat puuling. 
Although it was expected that participants with high hypnotic ability would behave 
according to the dissociated control model following an induction, it was not expected that 
participants with high hypnotic ability would perform the same on these tasks outside of the 
context of hypnosis. Nonetheless, it is important to note that both recently reponed 
experimental data by Ray (1997) and theoretical arguments by Kirsch (1997) generally 
support both the idea that there may be important hypnotic susceptibility differences 
outside of the context of hypnosis, and the idea that an hypnotic induction may not be 
necessary for revealing these differences. In addition. it seerns possible that asking 
hypnotized participants to engage in demanding cognitive tasks. such as the memory tasks 
used in this study. is simply incompatible with maintainhg a "state" of hypnosis. In order 
to perform complex cognitive tasks, participants may "alert" themselves frorn hypnosis. In 
short, participants in Study Four who received an hypnotic induction before completing the 
battery of memory tasks may have been hypnotized at the beginning and end of the session, 
but not in the rniddle, when completing the tasks. In this view, participants with high 
hypnotic ability who received an induction might be considered to be completing the tasks 
under essentially the same conditions as participants who participated outside of the context 
of hypnosis. 
Contrary to expectations, participants with high hypnotic ability perfomed better 
than participants with low hypnotic ability on the Word Sequencing task both within and 
outside of the context of hypnosis. The average correlation between the actual study order 
and the order in which the participant placed the cards during the organization task was 
higher for participants with high hypnotic abiiity as compared to participants with low 
hypnotic ability. This nsult seerns quite inconsistent with what one would expect from the 
dissociated control perspective. However, it seems at least possible that in an undergraduate 
population, such a task is not difficult enough and/or measures something quite different 
from what it measures in a population of patients with frontal lobe damage. 
Given the nature of the Word Sequencing task and the results from the other frontal 
memory tasks, it seems at least possible that part of what the task is measuring in a 
non-brain damaged population is something other than frontal lobe functioning. More 
specifically, in the absence of a strong interference component, it is possible that 
participants who have supenor imagery ability may be able to do quite well on the Word 
Sequencing task. Such ability has often been associated with both high hypnotic ability 
(Labelle, Laurence, Nadon and Peny, 1990; Lynn and Mue, 1986) and memory (Bolles, 
1988, Dywan, 1995 ,1997). 
In retrospect. when compared to the temporal recency judgement task of Milner, 
Coni, and Leonard (199 l), in which participants are shown a long senes of stimuli, either 
words or pictures. and occasionally asked to make a judgement about which of two stimuli 
was presented more recentiy, the Word Sequencing Tasks may simply not bave been a 
difficult enough interference task to find the subile differences we were looking for. 
According to S himamura ( 1995) impairment in the ability to encode and retrieve semantic 
information in frontal lobe patients is especially likely to occur when interfering 
information is presented prior to new leaniing. On the face of it, the Word Sequencing task 
is simply not as difficult an interference task as. Say, the AB-AC interference or Source 
Amnesia tasks. This explanation has gained some support as a result of more recent work at 
the University of Waterloo. Using a task very s i d a r  to that of Milner. Corsi, and Leonard 
(199 l), in which participants are shown a long series of stimulus words and occasionally 
asked to make a judgement about which of two stimuli was presented more recently. 
Vongphrachanh (1998) has demonstrated that participants with high hypnotic ability tend to 
perfom more poorly than participants with low hypnotic ability on this task. especially 
when making judgements about items at moderate temporal distance from each other, i.e. 
when asked to judge the relative recency of two items which are neither extremely close nor 
extremely far apart in presentation. 
The pattem of results observed in Study Four seems exmmely difficult to explain 
from either the sociocognitive (Spanos, 1986) or dissociated expenence (Kihlstrom, 1992) 
account. According to both theories, any unsuggested effects of hypnosis on memory are 
due to the more or less subtle demand characteristics of the situation and the best 
explanation of these data is that there was sornething about the experimental situation that 
tipped-off some participants to the relevance of their hypnotic ability and as a result, 
participants in the non-hypnotic context performed in the sarne way as participants in the 
hypnotic context (Kirsch and Council, 1992). However, great care was taken in Study Four 
to make sure that participants who participated in the expriment outside of the context of 
hypnosis remained unaware of the nlevance of their hypnotic ability until the end of the 
second session. La addition, insofar as participants with high hypnotic ability were 
responding to the demands of the situation in the context of hypnosis, one would predict a 
pattern of poor performance on aii memory tasks. However, what was observed was a 
pattern of performance in which participants with high hypnotic ability had more difficulty 
than participants with low hypnotic abiiity on some tasks but not on othea, most notably 
tasks which involved recognition rather than recdi. It remains a considerable challenge to 
explain how participants with high hypnotic ability rnight have known that they were 
supposed to perfom more poorly than participants with low hypnotic ability on some rasks. 
just as well as participants with low hypnotic ability on othen. and even better than 
participants with low hypnotic ability on the Word Sequencing Task. 
In summary. while some of the data collected in Study Four is somewhat 
inconsistent with the dissociated control model. overall the data is more supportive of the 
dissociated control model than the sociocognitive and dissociative experience explanations. 
Only the dissociated control model would predict that participants with high hypnotic 
ability would, in general, exhibit the sarne deficits on the frontal memory tasks as do 
participants w ith frontal lobe damage. 
General Discussion 
The main purpose of the four studies reported here was to attempt to better 
discriminate which of the three currently available theories (sociocognitive, dissociated 
experience, dissociated control) might best explain the phenornenon of suggested arnnesia. 
The results presented here tend to support the dissociative control view over the two 
alternative accounts. First, the results of Studies One and Two would seem to indicate that 
in contrat to the predictions of the sociocognitive (Spanos, 1986) and dissociative 
experience (Kihls~om, 1992) models, but consistent with the predictions of the dissociative 
control model (Woody and Bowers, 1994), an active and effortful attempt to try to put the 
targeted matenal "out of mind" following a suggestion for amnesia is not necessary to 
produce suggested amnesia. Second. the results of Study Three seem to indicate that in 
conuast to the predictions of the sociocognitive and dissociated control models, but 
consistent with the prediction of the dissociated control model. the experience of 
task-relevant thoughts and imagery is not necessary to produce suggested amnesia. 
The results from Studies One, Two and Three an quite consistent with previous 
findings which seem to indicate that suggested amnesia is the result of processes different 
from those involved in intentional forgetting (trying to forget) (Davidson and Bowers, 
199 1; Bowen and Woody, 1996). These findings are also broadly consistent with previous 
findings (Miller and Bowen, 1993; Hargadon, Woody and Bowers, 1995) with respect to 
the role of task-relevant thoughts and imagery in the experience of suggested analgesia. It 
would appear that for amnesia, as for analgesia, ta&-relevant thoughts and imagery are not 
necessary to produce hypnotic respondiog. Moreover, as for analgesia, it would appear that 
it is not important that such imagery is engaged in by hypnotized participants as an active 
attempt to enact the suggestion (Miller and Bowers, 1993). It seems likely, given the 
accurnulating evidence, that task-relevant thoughts and imagery may be passively 
expenenced concomitants of direct suggestions for such thoughts and irnagery, rather than n 
cntically important determinant of the suggested effect (Miller and Bowers, 1993; 
Hargadon, Woody and Bowen, 1995). indeed, it rnay be that elaborate suggestions for 
tasic-relevant thoughts and imagery are not necessary for producing a suggested effect in 
participants with high hypnotic ability, and that simple and direct suggestions rnight work 
just as well, if not bener, at les t  for some participants (Hargadon, Woody and Bowen, 
1995). In contrast, suggestions for task-relevant thoughts and imagery may be important 
determinants for participants of lesser hypnotic ability and historicaily may have been 
included in standard suggestions in order to enable participants of lesser hypnotic ability to 
expenence an hypnotic-like effect. in a manner quite consistent with sociocognitive theory 
(Kihlstrom, 1985; Lynn, Mue and Weekes, 1990; Oakmiui and Woody, 1996; Spanos, 
1986). 
In addition to the rrsults of the studies of suggested amnesia reported here, which 
appear to support the dissociated control model, overall the data from Study Four is more 
supportive of the dissociated control model than either the sociocognitive or the dissociated 
experience account. Only the dissociated control model would predict that participants with 
high hypnotic ability would, in general, exhibit the same deficits on frontal memory tasks 
as do participants with fiontal lobe damage. 
1t is important to note that while the dissociated control model (Woody and Bowen, 
1994) appears to best account of the data presented here. there remain several challenges to 
the dissociated control account of the effecü of hypnosis on rnemory. First. it remains to be 
explained, from the dissociative control perspective. why participants in Study Four with 
high hypnotic ability had more diffculty with the frontal memory tasks outside of the 
context of hypnosis, rather than only within the context of hypnosis. Second, according to 
the dissociated conuol rnodel, the experience of suggested amnesia results from the more or 
less direct activation of subsystems of control in a process that bypasses the integrative, 
planning and attentionai functions of the central executive. As a result, suggested effects 
occur in an automatic and effortiess way as routinized behavioun are mn off without the 
volitional level of control (Woody and Bowen. 1994). However, there is a perplexing 
problem with the explanation of suggested amnesia according to the dissociated control 
rnodel. It remains to be explained what subsystems of conuol are responsible for the 
experience of a very targeted amnesia, such as was observed for the "birds" in Studies Two 
and Three. Finaily, the nature of the relationship between the subtle and unsuggested 
effects of hypnosis (or hypnotic abiiity) on mernory and the dramatic effects of suggested 
amnesia remains to be explained. In the following discussion, consideration of each of 
these challenges precedes suggestions for future research. 
It is tme that the results from Study Four were somewhat surprising. At the outset of 
these investigations it was not predicted that participants with high hypnotic ability would 
have more dificulty with the frontal memory tasks outside of the context of hypnosis. as 
compared to participants with low hypnotic ability. However, it is at lest  possible that an 
hypnotic induction or context is not necessary to reveal inte~sting individual differences 
between participants with high and low hypnotic ability (Kirsch, 1997; Ray, 1997). 
Researchen of different theoretical backgrounds have recently begun to speculate 
that the phenomena associated with hypnosis may be best understood by integrating the 
sociocognitive and dissociation accounts of hypnotic responding (Barber. in press; Woody 
and Sadler, 1998) and that there may be a sub-group of participants with high hypnotic 
ability who are prone to dissociative or amnesic phenomena outside of the context of 
hypnosis. From the perspective of dissociated control theory, Woody and Sadler ( 1998) 
have argued that the three theones of hypnotic behaviour - sociocognitive, dissociated 
experience, and dissociated control can be combined to explain hypnotic responding. In 
brief, according to this view, the experience of non-volition in hypnosis could result from 
the appropriate interpretation of external cues in arnbiguous situations (sociocognitive), 
from alterations in the interna1 monitoring of volition (dissociated experience). or from 
changes in the executive control of behaviour (dissociated control) (Woody and Sadler. 
1998). Using data from a variety of sources, Woody and Sadler (1998) argue that the 
individual-difference detemiinants of hypnotic performance may Vary with the nature of the 
suggestion. with individual differences in social and waking suggestibility k ing  
responsible for performance on the easiest suggestions on the standard scaies and individual 
differences in dissociative ability being responsible for performance on more difficult 
items. In addition, there is some evidence that the individuai differences that ailow some 
people to pass the more difficult items on the standard scales of hypnotic ability rnay reflect 
more hindamental diffennces between people with high hypnotic ability and those of lesser 
hypnotic ability. Using modehg techniques. Oakman and Woody (1996) have 
demonstrated that the individual differences underlying hypnotic suggestibility rnay be 
typological rather than dimensional. Such a finding suggests that the difference between 
people with high hypnotic ability and people with lesser hypnotic ability may be a 
difference in "kind," rather than simply a difference in "amount" of hypnotic ability. It rnay 
be that the characteristic that separates at least some people with high hypnotic ability from 
othen is the ability or propensity to experience dissociative phenomena outside of the 
context of hypnosis. Consistent with such a view. it has recently been reported (Szechtman. 
Woody, Bowers, & Nahmias, 1998) that the functional brain imaging patterns of activation 
of highly hypnotizable people who could hallucinate and highiy hypnotizable people who 
could not hallucinate were svikingly different. not only when given a suggestion for 
amnesia but even while simply listening to a recorded message. 
In a recent attempt to explain hypnotic responding from the perspective of 
sociocognitive theory, T.X. Barber (in press) has reached similar conclusions. Barber (in 
press) argues that there may be three different dimensions of hypnosis (positive response 
set. fantasy, and amnesia) and that individuals can achieve high scores on standard scales of 
hypnotic ability for different reasons. In this view. sorne individuals achieve high scores on 
standard scales of hypnotic ability by having a very positive bbset" and high motivation to 
have expenences consistent with hypnotic responding. Altematively, some individuals 
achieve high scores on standard scales of hypnotic ability as the result of being very good at 
engaging in fantasy and imagination. FinaUy. some individuals achieve high scores on 
standard scales of hypnotic ability as the result of king prone to amnesic phenomena 
outside of the context of hypnosis. Barber (in press) concludes that there may be important 
individual differences within the population of people with high hypnotic ability and that 
some people with high hypnotic ability are prone to experiencing amnesic phenomena 
outside of the context of hypnosis. 
summary, according to two very recent theoretical formulations of the 
dissociative control and sociocognitive positions, there is a sub-group of individuals with 
high hypnotic ability who are extremely prone to dissociation (Woody and Sadler, 1998) or 
amnesia (Barber, in press) outside of the context of hypnosis. Given these recent theoretical 
developments, the results of Study Four appear somewhat less mystenous. It is less 
surprising that at lest  some participants with high hypnotic ability show some impairment 
on frontal memory tasks, as compared to participants with low hypnotic ability. If the 
results of Study Four are replicated in future research, an interesting challenge is to explore 
what other individuai difference variables might distinguish participants with high hypnotic 
ability who demonstrate amnesic (dissociative) phenomena outside of the context of 
hypnosis from participants with high hypnotic ability who do not. 
Tuming next to the phenornenon of suggested amnesia, while the experirnental 
evidence on suggested hypnotic amnesia is generally consistent with the implications of the 
dissociated control account, the specific subsystems of control responsible for suggested 
amnesia remain unknown. Recall that according to the dissociated control model, the 
experience of suggested amnesia results from the direct activation of subsystems of control 
and occurs in an automatic and effortless way as routinized behavioua are run off without 
the volitional level of control (Woody and Bowers. 1994). In this view, the frontal 
supervisory system operates as a higher-coatrol modulator of lower-level processing 
(Shallice, 1988) and has an important roie in memory retrieval. According to the 
dissociated control view, hypnosis weakens supervisory system functioning. resulting in 
relatively poor convoi over the description and verification phases of memory (Woody and 
Bowers, 1994). However, it remains to be explained what subsystems of control are 
responsible for the experience of a very targeted amnesia, such as was observed for the 
"birds" in Studies Two and Three. 
Associative networks are at the heart of current co~ectionist models of memory 
(McClelland & Rummelheart, 1986) and Kihistrom (1985) has described in considerable 
detail how suggested amnesia may be understood in terrns of a co~ectionist model of 
memory. According to the ACT model (Anderson, 1983) and other network models of 
memory, the declantive memory store can be represented by a graph structure with nodes 
representing concepts and associative links representing relationships between them. In this 
manner, factual knowledge is represented as propositions consisting of subjects and 
predicates, relations and arguments. Sorne propositions are semantic in nature (e.g. Birds 
have wings, A robin is a kind of bird). Other propositions are more episodic in nature and 
form the record of autobiographical memory (e.g. I learned about robins in the fourth grade, 
1 learned a list of birds today). A new event is encoded in memory in te= of preexisting 
knowledge. Perceptual processes activate nodes representing the features of an event, and 
Links representing the relations among perceived features are formed - resulting in a new 
proposition. According to Kihlstrom (1985). dunng hypnosis the participant encodes a set 
of propositions describing the hypnotic event and experiences. As a result, several types of 
nodes are linked with the propositions representing factual descriptions of the events and 
experience of hypnosis. Some of these nodes are semantic in nature (e.g. A robin is a kind 
of bird) while others are more episodic in nature (e.g. 1 Iearned a list of birds today). 
According to Kibistrorn (1985), suggestions for hypnotic amnesia produce selective 
weakening of associative links in episodic memones, resulting in specific disruptions in 
episodic memory retrieval (e.g. 1 learned a list of birds today). Such an explanation. in 
combination with the dissociative control view of the effects of hypnosis on memory may 
go some way towards providing an account of a possible mechanism for selective suggested 
amnesia. 
According to Woody and Bowen ( 1994) and Kihlstrom ( 1985) the effects of 
hypnosis on memory are the result of alterations in the control of episodic rnemory. 
According to Woody and Bowers (1994). it is the weakening of the supervisory functions 
especially responsible for episodic memory that results in poorer control over the 
description and verification phases of memory. According to Kihlstrom (1985). it is the 
weakening of associative links in episodic memones as the result of direct suggestions that 
results in dismptions of episodic memory retrieval. Thus, it seems possible that the 
erperience of suggested amnesia is the result of the relative weakening of associative links 
in episodic rnemory due to specific suggestions for amnesia combined with the more 
generai effect of hypnosis (or hypnotic ability) on the description and verification phases of 
memory. While there is cumntly no data to support such a view, one possibility for future 
research is to attempt to determine whether or not participants with high hypnotic ability 
who exhibit poorer penonnance on frontal memory tasks also tend to report a more 
compelling experience of suggested amnesia 
It would appear that in contrast to the prevailing view that there are no effects of 
hypnosis on memory in the absence of specific suggestions to that effect (Kihlstrom and 
Schacter, 1995), the unsuggested effects of hypnosis (or hypnotic ability) on rnernory rnay 
importantly determine the expenence of suggested arnnesia. Indeed, given the currently 
incomplete explanation of how specific associative links are weakened following specific 
suggestions for amnesia (Kihlstrom, l985), it is interesting to speculate about other 
explanations for how suggestions for amnesia achieve their effect. An intriguing possibility 
is that rather than affecting associative links in episodic memory, suggestions for amnesia 
achieve their effect via an inhibition of verbal response similar to the inhibition of motor 
response observed for motor chailenge items on the standard scaies. 
Motor challenge items on standard scaies usuaily consist of a simple rnotor 
suggestion ("Your arm is as stiff as if it were made of iron"), followed by the instruction to 
to oppose or overcome it ('Try to bend your am"). According to Woody and Bowen 
(1994). the "genuine" effect of hypnosis is the weakening of the executive level of control. 
As a result, as soon as a hypnotized peaon tries to cary out the challenge suggestion, 
thereby invoking executive control, he or she can have the experience thai the effortful 
attention required for the task, for example bending his or her m, is notably less effective 
than it norrnally is outside of the context of hypnosis. In shon, rnotor challenge items give 
hypnotized people the oppoaunity to expenence the executive level of control as 
uncharacteristically weak and as a result, hypnotized people c m  corne to uuly believe that 
they cannot lift their amis (Woody and Bowea. 1994). 
Standard suggestions for amnesia superficidy resemble motor challenge items. 
Consider the suggestion for post-hypnotic arnnesia contained in the Stanford Hypnotic 
Susceptibility Scale. Form C (SHSS: C) (Weitzenhoffer and Hilgard, 1962). 
Stay completely relaxed. but listen carefully to what 1 tell you next. 
In a little while 1 shall begin counting backwards from twenty to one. You 
will awaken gradually, but you will still be in your present state for most of 
the count. When 1 reach "five" you will open your eyes, but you will not be 
fully awake. When 1 get to "one" you will be entirely roused up, in your 
normal state of wakefulness. You will have been so relaxed, however, that 
you will have trouble recalling the things 1 said to you and the things you 
experienced . It will prove to cost so rnuch effort to recall that you will 
prefer not to try. It will be much easier just to forget everything until I tell 
you that you cm remember. You will forget al1 that has happened until 1 Say 
to you: "Now you can remernber everything!" You will not remember 
anything until then. 
(Weitzenhoffer and Hilgard, 1962. p. 30) 
As for a motor challenge suggestion, the above suggestion might be considered to 
consist of two different messages to hypnotized participants, a simple suggestion to forget 
and a more or less direct suggestion that try as hard as they may. they will not be able to 
remember. Indeed, they are encouraged to believe that trying to remember will require so 
rnuch effort that they rnight as well not try at dl. Thus, it may be that as for motor challenge 
items. suggestions for amnesia give hypnotked people the opportunity to experience the 
executive level of control as uncharacteristically weak and as a result. they can corne to 
believe that they cannot rernember (Woody and Bowea. 1994). It is relaiively simple to 
extend such an explanation to account for more specific suggestions for amnesia, for 
example, a suggestion to forget "al1 the birds." words that start with the letter b'T." and the 
number "9" (Evans, 1979). Al1 that is required is that people have the opportunity to 
experience the executive level of control as uncharacteristicdly weak and to believe that 
they will be unable to remember the targeted materiai. 
Sirnilarly, rather than being a result of a retrieval failure per se. participants may 
experience "amnesia" only insofar as they are encouraged to interpret their expenence of 
not being able to easily "tell" as an expenence of not being able to "remember." Such an 
account certainly accords with some of the descriptions of the experience of suggested 
amnesia offered by participants in Study Two. There was a wide variety of responses to the 
question "Did you feel like you had really forgotten the words?" Several participants with 
high hypnotic ability reponed being completely unaware of the targeted materid until afier 
being given the reversal cue. For example. one participant reported " 1 didn't even notice 
until you told me I could remember them." and another reported "Yes. 1 said the other three 
lists and 1 thought that is it. that is the end of the list." However, most participants reported 
being at least sornewhat aware of the targeted material. For example, consider the following 
reports:" 1 don't lcnow. 1 could have recailed them, but unless you asked me to 1 wouldn't 
have, son of like when something is on the tip of your tongue but you can't get it out;" "No. 
1 still kind of knew that 1 knew them, but I just had them blocked off:' "You could see 
hem, you could picture the words, but they just wouldn't come out;" " 1 guess 1 knew that 
there was something that 1 was supposed to remember, but they wouldn't come," and; 4 
kind of knew they were there, but 1 couldn't remember them to the point of saying them." 
In summary, while some participants descnbed what sounds like amnesia for the targeted 
material, many other participants described their experience in more ambiguous ternis that 
seem as much like not being able to "tell" or "say" as not "remernber." There are likely 
several ways to begin to attempt to explore this alternative account of suggested arnnesia. 
For example, one possibility would be to explore the extent to which performance on 
suggested amnesia items is correlated with performance on motor challenge items of 
various kinds. If processes similar to those responsible for motor inhibition items determine 
the response to a suggestion for arnnesia. then performance on suggested amnesia items 
should be more highly correlated with responses to motor inhibition items as compared to 
other kinds of suggestions. Given that relatively few people experience suggestions for 
amnesia. as compared to the "classic" motor challenge items on the standard scales, it 
seems likely that performance on suggested amnesia items should be mon highly comlated 
with relatively difficult, as compared to less difficult motor challenge items. Therefore, in 
order to explore this idea further it may be necessary to construct a measure of hypnotic 
ability that includes a p a t e r  variety of motor challenge items of gnded difficulty. 
In closing, it is important to note that in the study of hypnosis. as in other realms of 
science, available theory partiy determines what we see and certainly what we seek. The 
prevailing dissociated expenences or "amnesic barrie? view of the effects of hypnosis on 
memory encouraged a great deal of research on suggested amnesia and resulted in some 
consensus that there are no interesting effects of hypnosis on mernory in the absence of 
specific suggestions to that effect (Kihlstrom and Schacter. 1995). However, the emergence 
of an alternative theory, the theory of dissociated control (Woody and Bowers, 1994), 
encourages one to take a different perspective and ask new questions. The results of the 
studies reported here indicate that asking a sornewhat different question may reveal some 
very interesting unsuggested effects of hypnosis on rnemory. As might be expected. the 
theory of dissociated control cannot yet fully account for al1 of the effects of hypnosis on 
memory. However. while there is much left to explain adapting such a perspective allows 
one to perceive the literaiure on the effects of hypnosis on memory in a new way that 
suggests several interesting directions for future research. 
Appendices 
Appendix A 
Studv One: Experiential Ouestionnaire 
The Following question concerns your experience while you were listening to the 
instmctions to try to forget the birds. 
1. During the instructions 1 was confused about what 1 was supposed to do 
Not at All Very Much 
The Following questions concern your experience during the waiting period following 
the suggestion for amnesia. 
1. 1 was trying to remember the birds during the waiting period 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at Ai1 Very Much 
2. 1 was trying to forget the birds during the waiting period 
Not at Al1 Very Much 
The Following questions concern your experience following the waiting period, dunng 
the recall trial when you were asked to recall the other words (but not the birds). 
1. 1 felt like 1 forgot some of the words during the recall trial 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at Al1 Very Much 
3. 1 was trying to remember the birds during the recd trial 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at AU Very Much 
Appendix B 
Study One: 2 Condition (control. forgettinal X 3 Interval (baseline, learning. - waiting) 
ANOVA of Heart Rate 
Tests of Between Subjects Effects 
Sum of 
Source of Variation Squares DF 
Condition 165.22 1 
Within Cells 9327.19 44 
Tests of Within Subjects Effect and Interaction 
Source of Variation Sum of 
Squares DF 
In terval 2494.0 1 2 
Condition by Interval 572.10 2 










F - Sig. 
of F 
F - Sig. 
of F 
Appendix C 
Studv Two: Rating Instructions For Judnes 
The Research 
In this experiment, Ps were hypnotized and then asked to memorize a list of 16 words, i.e. 4 
words from each of four categories (birds, beverages. fumiture and flowers). After Ss had 
leamed the list. they were asked to forget one of the categories of words (the birds). Now, 
after they were told to forget the birds. they were asked to wait a half a minute or so before 
they began to recall the rest of the words. During this "waiting" period, subjects were free 
to engage in whatever cognitive strategies that they rnight like in order to "forget" the birds. 
What Ken and 1 are particularly interested in are the following: 
1) What the subjects doing during the waiting period; 
2) Whether or not the subjects really feel like they had forgotten the birds. and; 
3) Whether or not the Ss reported task-relevant thoughts and imagery 
To that end, 1 would like you to provide four ratings for each of the following protocols 
1. 1 would like a rating on a scale of 1- 10 of the degree to which the P seems to be engaged 
in an active, effortful and volitional strategy during the waiting period. Some Ps report 
engaging in active, effortful and volitional strategies. Other reports sound more "passive" 
and involuntary. Try not to confuse vague with passive. Some people just seem to be pretty 







What were you thinking about when you were asked to wait? 
1.1 was concentrating on rememberhg the words. 1 thought about my psych class and the 
man who couldn't forget. (1 would Say this is about a 10) 
2.1 tned not to think of any of the words. I uied to keep my mind off it. 1 was thinking of 
other things. (this too seems much more like a 10 than a 1) 
3. I could remember the words up until the tirne you said begin (end of the waiting period) 1 
hadn't forgotten the bkds yet. 1 thought "there is a problem here" but after you said ''begin" 
1 couldn't nmember them and didn't think anything of it. W e  waiting 1 could see the 
categories. There may have been blank penod before you said "begin." ( now it seems to 
me chat this isn't as clear cut. There is a bit of a passive quality to this report not readily 
apparent in the others. 1 am particularly struck by the fact that this penon reports seeing the 
words rather than rehearsing or thinking about them. Thus I would rate this one as being 
closer to a 1 than to a 10.) 
II. 1 would like a rating on a scale of 1-10 of whether or not the P reports that he or she felt 
like he or she really forgot the words. Be careful here. responses range al1 the way from 
"No. 1 just wasn't saying them" to " Yes. 1 didn't realize that 1 had forgotten anything." The 
tricky ones will be those that are some variation of "1 knew they were there but 1 could not 
say them." "They were on the tip of rny tongue" or "1 blocked hem off." To my rnind. these 
responses are closer to the "no" end of the scale than to the "yes" end. These Ps report 
"knowing" that they have not reported something. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
YeS no 
they were just gone 1 knew they were there 
1 didn't know I forgot anything 1 blocked them off 
Tip of my tongue 
Examples: 
Did you really feel like you had forgotten the birds? 
1. The birds were the clearest group of them dl. (1 would say "no") 
2. Yes (1 would go "yes" on this one) 
3. There was a little suuggle, but 1 knew that it was just a matter of time. 1 couldn't rhyme 
them off 1 guess. (This one seems much more like a "no" than a "yes") 
4. Yeah. 1 had the thrre lists and 1 felt that's it, that's the end of the list. (Yes) 
5.1 think that there was a couple. 1 kept on wanting to Say "cardinal," but 1 knew that wasn't 
right ( Indeed, it was not one of the birds to be memorized). 1 think that 1 was trying to 
remember them instead of trying to forget them. m i s  response to me implies that the 
penon knew that he or she had forgotten "something." Thus 1 would Say that it is closer to a 
"no*' than a "yes.") 
m. 1 would like a rating on a scale of 1 - 10 of whether or not you think that the P was trying 
to remember the birds. i.e. some people seem to report trying to remember while others 
seem less interested or concemed about what they cannot remember. It may be difficult to 
give some of the protocols a rating on this scale. Just take your best guess. 
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
not q i n g  trying quite hard 
unconcerned concerned 
obiivious puzzled 
IV. 1 would like a simple dichotomous (yes or no) judgement about whether or not the P 
reports task-relevant thoughts and imagery. This one should be pretty obvious. 
Appendix D 
Studv Two: 2 Condition (control. foreettine) X 3 IntervaUbaseline. lemine. waitine) 
ANOVA of Heart Rate 
Tests of Between Subjects Effects 
Sum of 
Source of Variation Squares DF 
Hypnotic Ability 280.90 1 
Within Cells 6969.50 38 
Tests of Within Subjects Effect and Interaction 
Source of Variation Sum of 
Squares DF 
In tervai 473 1 .25 3 
Hypnotic Ability by Interval 123.85 3 








4 I .28 
26.07 
F - Sig. 
of F 
F - Sig. 
of F 
Appendix E 
S tudv Three: Exmxiential Ouestionnaire 
The Following questions concern your experience during the waiting period following 
the suggestion for amnesia. 
1. Rate the degree to which you experienced imagery during the wairing (counting) period 
No Imagery Imagery Expenenced 
Throughout 
2. Rate the degree to which you experienced thoughü (other than imagery) during the 
waiting (counting) period 
No Thoughts Thoughts Experienced 
Throughout 
3. During the waiting (counting) period 1 was trying to forget the birds 
Not at Ail Very Much 
4. During the waiting (counting) penod 1 was trying to remember the birds 
Not at Al1 Very Much 
The following questions concern your experience dunng the recall trial when you 
were asked to recall the other words (but not the birds). 
1. 1 felt like 1 had forgotten the birds 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at Al1 Very Much 
2. I felt like 1 had control over remembering the birds during the recall trial 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
No Control Complete Control 
2. 1 was trying to remember the birds during the recail triai 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at Al1 Very Much 
3. 1 was tiying to forget the birds dunng the recall trial 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at Al1 Very Much 
5. I could have recalled the target words if I had tried hvder dunng the recall tnd 
It is important that we understand your experience of this experiment. How would 
you rate the depth to which you felt hypnotued during the experiment today? 
Not hypnotized at ail 
In nomai waking state 
Deeply hypno tized 
Appendix F 
Studv Three: 2 Hwnotic Abilitv (high. low) X 2 Condition (standard, distraction) 
ANOVAs of Participants= Ratinas of Experience Durinrr the Waiting Period 
Task-Relevant h a ~ e r v  
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Studv Three: 2 Hvpnotic Abilitv (high, low) X 2 Condition (standard. distraction) 
ANOVAs of Partici~ants= Ratin~s of Experience During the Arnnesia Triai 
Trying to Remember 
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Felt Like Forgot 
Sum of Mean 




2- way interaction 1 1 .O3 1 1 1 .O3 
HA X Condition 1 1 .O3 1 1 1 .O3 
Explained 394.88 3 131.63 
Residual 1 1  1.90 36 3.1 1 
Could Have Remembered if Tried Harder 
Sum of Mean 
Source of Variation Squares DF Square 
Main Effects 198.90 2 99.45 
HA 176.40 1 176.40 
CONDITION 22.50 1 22.50 
2- way Interaction 19.60 1 19.60 
HA X CONDITION 19.60 1 19.60 
Explained 2 18-50 3 72.83 
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Appendix H 
Studv Four: StimuIi for the AB-AC interference task 
lion - hunter, lion - circus 
river - pond, river - brook 
thief - crime, thief - bandit 
bread - wheat, bread - basket 
bath - towel, bath - soap 
eagle - mountain, eagle - air 
hand - touch, hand - lotion 
king - power, king - royal 
moon - rocket, moon - crescent 
salt - table, salt - earth 
city - f m ,  city - village 
stove - furnace, stove - bum 
practice item: tree - wood 
Appendix I 
Studv Four: Stimuli for the Source Amnesia Task 
Sports 
1. The narne of a number two wood in golf is "brassie." 
Q What is the narne of a number two wood in golf? 
2. in the 1960's. "Kelso" was the narne of the racehone of the year for many successive 
years. 
Q What was the name of the racehorse of the year for many successive years in the 
19609s? 
3. The last name of the baseball player who pitched a perfcct garne in the 1956 world 
series was "Larsen." 
Q What was the last name of the baseball player who pitched a perfect game in the 
1956 world series? 
4. The boxer Jack Dempsey was also known as the "Manassa Mauler." 
Q What was the last name of the boxer also known as the "Manassa Mauler?" 
5. The name of the fint man to mn the mile in under four minutes was Roger Bannister. 
Q What was the last name of the first man to run the mile in under four minutes? 
6. Carlisle College was the narne of the college for which Jim Thorpe played football. 
Q What was the name of the college for which Jim Thorpe played football? 
1. Charlemagne was the fint d e r  of the Holy roman Empire 
Q Who was the first d e r  of the Holy Roman Empire? 
2. In 1963 the nuclear submarine "Thresher" sunk in the Atlantic. 
Q What was the name of the nuclear submhne that sunk in the Atlantic in 1963? 
3. The discoverer of the vaccine for smallpox was Dr. J e ~ e r .  
Q What is the name of the discoverer of the smallpox vaccine? 
4. Yuri Gagarin was the cosmonaut who was the fmt person to orbit around the earih 
Q What is the last name of the cosmonaut who was the fmt penon to orbit the earth? 
5. The name of the Union general who defeated the Confederate army at the banle of 
Gettysberg was George Meade. 
Q What was the last name of the Union general who defeated the Confederate army at 
the battle of Gettysberg? 
6. The generai named Hannibal was from the city of Carthage. 
Q What city was the general narned Hannibal from? 
Geography 
1. Canberra is the capital of AustraIia. 
Q What is the capital of Australia? 
2. Angel Falls is located in Venezuala. 
Q In which country is Angel Falls located? 
3. The Caspian sea is the body of water that lies between Russia and Iran. 
Q What is the body of water that lies between Russia and Iran? 
4. The capital of Kentucky is Frankfurt. 
Q What is the capital of Kentucky? 
5. The highest mountain in South Amenca is Aconcagua. 
Q What is the name of the highest mountain in South Amenca? 
6. The name of the river that runs through Rome I the Tiber. 
Q What is the narne of the river that runs through Rome? 
Entertainment (Movies and Music) 
1. "Wings" is the name of the fint movie to receive an Academy Award for Best Picture. 
Q What is the name of the fmt movie to receive an Academy Award for Best Picture? 
2. The female star of the movie "Casablanca" was Ingrid Bergman. 
Q What was the 1s t  name of the female star of the movie "Casablanca?" 
3. The Song "1 Love Paris" was written by Cole Porter. 
Q What was the last narne of the Song wn'ter who wrote "1 Love Paris?" 
4. Irving Berlin wrote the Song "How Deep is the Ocean." 
Q What is the last name of the man who wrote the Song "How Deep is the Ocean?" 
5. Connie Francis is the name of the singer who made a hit recording of the Song "Who is 
Sorry Now." 
Q What is the last name of the singer who made a hit recording of the song "Who is 
Sorry Now." 
6. The actor who portrayed the sheriff in the movie "High Noon" was played by Gary 
Cooper. 
Q What is the narne of the actor who portrayed the shenff in the movie "High Noon?" 
Literature 
1. Brobdingnag is the name of the land of the giants in "Gulliver*~ Travels." 
Q What is the name of the land of the giants in "Gulliver's Travels?" 
2. The poet Longfellow wrote that "Into each life a little min must fall." 
Q What is the last name of the poet who wrote that "Into each life a little rain must 
fall?" 
3. The name of the boy in the book "Treasure Island" was "Jim Hawkins." 
Q What was the last name of the boy in the book 'Treasure Island?" 
4. Cleo was the name of the Goldfish in the story f Pinocchio. 
Q What was the name of the goldfish in the story of Pinocchio? 
5. Robert Burns is the name of the man who is wideiy regarded as the national poet of 
Scotland. 
Q What s the last name of the man who is widely regarded as the national poet of 
Scotland? 
6. The last name of the first American author to win the Nobel Prize for Literature was 
Henry. 
Q What was the last narne of the first American author to win the Nobel Prize for 
Li terature? 
Easy Questions for the Recall Phase 
1. What is the name of a dned grape? (raisin) 
2. What is the name of the horse like animal with black and white stripes? (zebra) 
3. What is the capital of France? (Paris) 
4. Which sport is associated with Wimbledon? (tennis) 
5. What is the name of Dorothy's dog in "The Wizard of Oz" ('ïoto) 
6. What was the last name of the author who wrote "Romeo and Juliet?" 
7. What was the last name of the brothers who flew the fint airplane at Kitty Hawk? 
Wright) 
8. In which sport do you use the temis "gutter" and "Ailey?" (bowling) 
9. What precious gem is nd? (ruby) 
10. What was the name of the supposedly unsinkable ship that sank on its maiden voyage in 
19 12? (Titanic) 
Appendix J 
Studv Four: Cognitive Estimation Ouestionnaire 
Questions which differ from the original Shallice and Evans (1978) task are written in 
parentheses. 
On average, how many pmgrams are there on any one TV channel between six and 
eleven p.m.? 
What is the height of the Dana Porter Library here at the University of Waterloo? 
(What is the height of the Post Office tower?) 
How fast do race horses gallop? 
How much money per year does the highest paid job in Canada pay? 
(What is the best paid job or occupation in Britain today?) 
What is the age of the oldest person living in Canada today? 
(What is the age of the oldest penon living in Britain today?) 
What is the length of the average man's spine? 
How many slices are there in a sliced Ioaf f bread? 
How far is it from Paris to New York? 
(What is the largest fish in the world?) 
How tall is the average Canadian woman? 
(How ta11 is the average Engiish woman?) 
10. How heavy is a six pack of beer? 
(How heavy is a full pint bottle of milk?) 
1 1. How long is the average neck tie? 
12. What is the width of a city bus? 
(What is the width of a double-decker bus?) 
13. What is the length of a five dollar bill? 
(What is the length of a pound note?) 
14. How many carnels are there in Holland? 
Appendix K 
Studv Four: Stimuli for the Metamernom Task 
Set A 
1. Mary was cooking Thanksgiving supper when suddenly she reaiited that she did not 
have any potatoes. 
2. S he looked very nice in her new shoes. 
3. The underwater diver was looking for some clams. 
4. At the museurn we saw some ancient relics made of clay. 
5. The young hitch - hiker started in Los Angeles and ended in Washindon. 
6. In the orchestra, Fred played the piano. 
7. During Our picnic we were supnzed to see the pheasant on the fence. 
8. After taking the kids to school the mother went to the dentist. 
9. The old man enjoyed playing canasta. 
10. The family went to the restaurant and ate chicken. 
1 1. On Sunday momings Jim loved to eat bacon. 
12. At college the young woman decided to study 
Set B 
12. Patty's garden was full of markolds. 
13. The boy had to get rabie shots after being bitten by the rabbit. 
14. It was a warm summer day and the girl was picking peaches. 
15. During his high school years Andrew's favounte sport was a f .  
16. Ann loved to travel and last year she went to Italv. 
17. Joe's favounte books are about travel. 
18. It was a pleasant day and Jonathan read under the svcamore tree. 
19. On their trip the couple slept in an old cottaee. 
20. The farmer took pnde in his crop of barlev. 
2 1. When the mailman opened the gate he was greeted by an angry spaniel. 
22. The fmt animal the chiIdren wanted to see at the zoo were the lions. 
23. For his birthday, David received a new guitar. 
Set C (non-presented set) 
24. The burglar broke in and stole a necklace. 
25. Fred loves to eat ham sandwiches for lunch. 
26. The boy said that when he grew up he wanted to be a camenter. 
27. Janet loved ail kinds of music but her favounte music was folk music. 
28. The lawyer spent much of his weekend relaxhg at the beach. 
29. The colour that the couple decided to paint their living room was blue. 
30. On the camping trip the family was bothered by fleas. 
3 1. Jack received a post card from his best friend who was living in France. 
Filler Sentences (used at the beginning of the study list) 
1 .  The young lad watched television. 
2. The trees were covered with snow. 
Appendix L 
S tudy Four: Sarn~le of Recognition Test for Metamernorv Task 
Choose the correct answer from the choices under each sentence. 
1. Patty's garden was full of 
Marigolds Daisies Roses Poppies 
Carnations Tulips Daffodils Lilies 
2. The boy had to get rabie shots after being bitten by the 
Skunk Fox Dog Coyote 
Rabbit Cat Wolf Lizard 
3. Fred loves to eat sandwiches for lunch 
Turkey Roast Beef Ham Tuna 
Chicken Egg Salad Cheese Meat Loaf 
4. Mary was cooking Thanksgiving supper when suddenly she realized that she did not 
have any 
S tuffing Flour Sugar Gravy 
Biscuits LettucePotatoes Corn 
5. It was a warm summer day and the girl was picking 
S trawbemes Grapes Bluebemes Cantaloupes 
Cherries Plums Peaches Apncots 
6. She tooked very nice in her new 
Shoes Dress S hirt S tockings 
Pants Skirt Coat Hat 
7. During his high school years. Andrew's favourite sport was . 
Tennis Basebaii Bowling Track 
S wirnming Football Basketbaii Golf 
8. The boy said that when he grew up he wanted to be a 
Doctor Fireman Scientist Lawyer 
Carpenter Policeman Engineer Actor 
9. The underwater diver was looking for some 
Bass Mussels Clams S hark 
Tuna Abalone Barracuda Starfish 
10. Ann loved to travel and last year she went to 
Spain France Hawaii Denmark 
England Italy Tahiti S witzerland 
1 1. The burglar broke in and stole a 
Television Diamond Ring Carnera S tereo 
Mink Coat Radio Purse Necklace 
12. At the museum we saw some ancient relics made of 
Clay Iron Bronze Silver 
Gold Dimonds Tin Rubies 
13. The young hitch - hiker staned in Los Angeles and ended in 
New York Washington Boston Baltimore 
New Orleans Philadel phia Chicago Miami 
14. in the orchestra, Fred played the 
Trumpet Oboe Trombone Piano 
Cello Flute Clarinet Violin 
15. Jack received a post card from his best friend who was living in 
Cairo Germany France Baghdad 
Spain America Israel Africa 
16. Joe's favourite books are about 
Science Travel War Music 
Detectives Gangsters Sports Aaimals 
17. It was pleasant day and Jonathan read under the tree. 
Elm Walnut Oak S ycamore 
Plum Maple B irch Ash 
18. On their trip the couple slept in an old 
Cabin Hotel Cottage Barn 
Tent Mansion Shed Boat 
19. The colour that the couple decided to paht their living room was 
Yellow Brown White Blue 
Green Grey Orange Tan 
20. During Our picnic we were suprized to see the on the fence. 
Crane Hawk Rooster Falcon 
Dove Crow Eagle Pheasant 
2 1. After taking the kids to school the mother went to the 
Dentist Market Bank Book Store 
Heaith Club Doc tor Beauty Shop Mal1 
22. On the camping trip the farnily was bothered by 
Mosquitoes Wolves Bears Fleas 
Bees Cougars Snakes Ants 
23. The farmer took pride in hi crop of 
Corn Wheat Oats Cotton 
Rice Pears Apples Barley 
24. When the mailman opened the gate he was greeted by an angry 
Beagle Collie German S heppard Doberman 
Setter Spaniel Bloodhound Dalmatian 
25. The old man enjoyed playing 
Checkea Bridge Chess Canasta 
Rummy Poker Dominoes Bingo 
26. The farnily went to the restaurant and ate 
Pizza S teak Spaghetti Hamburgers 
Fis h Pork Hot Dogs Chicken 
27. The first animals the children wanted to see at the zoo were the 
Lions Bears Tigen Elephants 
Snakes Seals Penguins Monkeys 
28. On Sunday mornings Jim loved to eat 
W affles H m  Poached Eggs Pancakes 
Sausages Bacon Steak Muffins 
29. At college the young woman decided to study 
Medicine Music Law Biology 
Engineering Astronomy Painting History 
30. For his birthday, David received a new 
Television Car Bicycle S tereo 
Cornputer Clock Guitar Dog 
3 1. The lawyer spent much of his weekend relaxing at the 
Club Beach Lake Mountains 
Cabin Pool  GY^ Tennis Court 
32. Janet loved al1 kinds of music but her favourite was music. 
Folk Romantic Dance Classicd 
Country Rock and Roll Jazz Bluegrass 
Appendix M 
MANOVA for Frontal Memorv Tasks 
Tests of Between Subject Effects 
Multivwiate Tests of Significance 
(Test Name = Pillais) 
Effect Value - F Hypoth DF 
HA ,53496 7.09373 6 
Condition . f 3582 0.969 17 6 







Discriminant Function Anaivsis for Frontal Memorv Tasks 
Direct Method: al1 variables passing the tolerance test are entered. 
Minimum tolerance tevel .................................... .00 100 
Canonical Discriminant Functions 
Maximum number of functions ...................... 1 
Minimum cumulative percent of variance 
Maximum significance of Wilks' Lambda 
Prior probability for each group is ,500000 
Variable Tolerance F to Remove 
FREE -9 176142 4.2790 
AC 1 ,9176142 8.8425 
W ilks' Lambda 
Standardized canonical discriminant function coefficients 
Function 1 
FREE -.5 1852 
AC 1 .7 1909 
Structural Matrix: 
Pooled within-groups correlations between discriminating variables and canonical 
discriminant functions (Variables ordered by size of correlation within function) 
Function 1 
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